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Anderson: Protecting Unmarried Cohabitants from the Religious Freedom Resto

PROTECTING UNMARRIED COHABITANTS
FROM THE RELIGIOUS
FREEDOM RESTORATION ACT
I. INTRODUCTION

Verna Terry and Robert Wilder wanted to move out of the apartment they
were sharing with another person.' To avoid paying double rent, they gave
notice to their landlord that they were leaving before they had actually found
other accommodations. 2 With one week remaining before their current lease
expired, they found a new apartment which had appliances, was in a nice
building, and in a good location. 3 During a phone conversation with Ms.
Donahue, the landlady, Ms. Terry asked if the apartment had a garage in which
her boyfriend could keep his tools.' Ms. Donahue responded that she was oldfashioned and refused to have unmarried couples as tenants.
In fact, Ms. Donahue was a devoutly religious person who believed that
intercourse outside of marriage was a sin.' She also believed that by renting
her apartment to an unmarried couple she would be aiding another in the
commission of a sin, which she considered in and of itself to be a sin.7 Due
to Ms. Donahue's refusal to rent, the couple was forced to take additional time

1. Donahue v. Fair Employment & Hous. Comm'n, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 32, 33 (Cal. Ct. App.
1991). The facts in other cases in which landlords have refused for religious reasons to rent to
unmarried cohabitants are substantially similar to the facts of Donahue. Among these cases, the only
notable differences are that in two cases, the landlords refused to rent to the unmarried couple after
having made an offer of rental. In the first case, the couple falsely represented that they were
married. Smith v. Fair Employment & Hous. Comm'n, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 395, 397 (Cal. Ct. App.
1994). In the second case, only one person of the couple saw the apartment and agreed to rent it.
Cooper v. French, 460 N.W.2d 2, 3 (Minn. 1990). In both cases, the landlords subsequently
refused to rent after learning that the couples were unmarried. In a third case, the tenants
represented that they were married, and the landlord demanded to see actual proof of the couple's
marriage. Jasniowski v. Rushing, No. 94 CH 5546, 2 (Cook County Cir. Ct. Dec. 22, 1994).
When the couple did not provide such proof, the landlord refused to rent the apartment. Id.
2. Donahue, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 33.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id. Mrs. Donahue had previously been a real estate broker in Los Angeles and had been a
l ndlady for 20 years. THOMAS F. COLEMAN, CHAIRPERSON, OFFICE OF THE CITY ATTORNEY, LOS
ANGELES CALIFORNIA, CONSUMER TASK FORCE ON MARITAL STATUS DISCRIMINATION,
SUPPLEMENT TO THE FINAL REPORT, UNMARRIED ADULTS, A NEW MAJORITY SEEKS CONSUMER
PROTECTION 305 (1990) [hereinafter SUPPLEMENT].
6. Donahue, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 33 n.1.
7. Donahue v. Fair Employment & Hous. Comm'n, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 32, 33 n. I (Cal. Ct. App.
1991).
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off of work to continue looking for an apartment. 8 Eventually they found an
apartment, but it cost $125 more per month than Ms. Donahue's apartment.
Additionally, it was smaller, needed to be cleaned, had neither laundry facilities,
a stove, nor a refrigerator, and was on a noisier street. 9 Thousands of other
couples'0 encounter this inability to rent housing because some landlords who

8. Id.at 34.
9. Id.
10. It is difficult to determine exactly how many unmarried couples are denied housing. With
regard to housing rights generally, few people either know that they have rights which protect them
from certain forms of housing discrimination or have time to pursue the matter. Telephone
Interview with Arthur Eskew, Housing Counselor, Roxbury Multi-Service Center, Roxbury, Mass.
(Feb. 20, 1996). Thus, primarily only "sophisticated people" file complaints or those who have the
time and patience to withstand lodging a discrimination suit. Id. However, knowing the number
of unmarried couples there are can help understand the potential magnitude of the problem. In 1990,
the Census Bureau indicated that there were 3,042,642 opposite-sex "unmarried partner households"
in the United States. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COM., 1990 CENSUS OF
POPULATION, SOCIAL AND ECON. CHARACTERISTICS, UNITED STATES, at tbl. 16 (1993) [hereinafter
1990 SOCIAL & ECON. CENSUS]. This means that there are more than six million people who could
be arbitrarily denied housing at any time. The Census Bureau defines an "unmarried partner
household" as a household "other than a 'married-couple household' that includes a householder and
an 'unmarried partner.'" Id. at B-15. "An 'unmarried partner' can be of the same sex or of the
opposite sex of the householder. An 'unmarried partner' in an 'unmarried-parmer household' is an
adult who is unrelated to the householder, but shares living quarters and has a close personal
relationship with the householder." Id. The number of cohabiting couples has increased
substantially in recent years, from 523,000 in 1970, to 1.5 million couples in 1980. Rita M.
Neuman, Note, Closing the Dooron CohabitantsUnder Wisconsin's Open HousingLaw, 1995 WIS.
L. REV.965, 987 n. 161 (1995). These figures indicate a 600% increase since 1970. Data available
for individual states indicates that in 1990 there were 128,668 "unmarried partner households" in
Illinois, 65,779 in Indiana, and 30,239 in Iowa. 1990 SOCIAL & ECON. CENSUS, supra, ILLINOIS,
at thl. 21; INDIANA, at tbl. 21; IOWA, at tbl. 21. Because of the increased rate of divorce and the
delay of marriage, these numbers are expected to increase. Maureen E. Markey, The Price of
Landlord's "Free" Exercise of Religion: Tenant's Right to Discrimination-FreeHousing and
Privacy, 22 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 699, 740-41 (1995).
The landlords in Attorney Generalv. Desilets stated that they had used their ten-year-old policy
to deny tenancies to at least ten cohabiting couples. Attorney Gen. v. Desilets, 636 N.E.2d 233,
235 (Mass. 1994). In Swanner v. Anchorage Equal Rights Commission, 874 P.2d 274 (Alaska
1994), the Commission brought the action against the landlord on behalf of three pairs of individuals
to whom the landlord refused to rent houses. Id. at 276. The Fair Housing Councils of Los
Angeles reported 62 complaints of marital status discrimination in the city of Los Angeles between
1986 and 1989. SUPPLEMENT, supra note 5, at 221. During the fiscal year 1989, 848 complaints
of housing discrimination were reported in California. Id. Thirty-nine percent of these complaints
were due to race, 35% were due to familial status discrimination, and 10% of the complaints were
due to marital status discrimination. Id. at 226.
The incidence of unmarried cohabitation is not an American phenomenon. The majority of
British citizens cohabit before marriage. Gary Jenkins, Cohabitation and the Local Church,
EPWORTH REV., Sept. 1993, at 47, 47. Over half of couples in Britain live together before
marrying, and a survey of Anglican clergy indicated that over 90% of couples in London marrying
in the church had lived together before the marriage. Id. And as in America, many couples in
Britain cohabit without ever marrying. Id.
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hold particular religious convictions" choose not to rent apartments 2 to
unmarried couples. 3 According to these landlords' religious beliefs, renting
an apartment to an unmarried couple would be facilitating sinful behavior.14

11. While in the example above, the landlords were Catholic, in other cases, the landlords are
of different faiths. Donahue, 2 Cal. Rptr. at 33 n. 1. See, e.g., Smith v. Fair Employment & Hous.
Comm'n, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 395, 397 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994) (Presbyterian landlord); Cooper v.
French, 460 N.W.2d 2, 3 (Minn. 1990) (landlord member of Evangelical Free Church); Jasniowski
v. Rushing, No. 94 CH 5546 (Cook County Cir. Ct. Dec. 22, 1994) (Evangelical Christian
landlord).
12. A situation in which a landlord charged an unmarried couple an increased amount of rent
would be a form of discrimination equivalent to refusing to rent. Teresa Coleman Hunter & Gary
L. Fischer, Essay, Housing: Fair Housing Testing-Uncovering Discriminatory Practices, 28
CREIGHTON L. REV. 1127, 1128 (1995). However, such a form of discrimination is not likely to
occur, given the fact that landlords object to the sinful conduct which unmarried couples engage in
on their property, and no cases have indicated that a higher rent would placate the landlords.
Additionally, rental under such terms may very well call into question the sincerity of the landlords'
religious beliefs. See infra note 50 for an explanation of "sincerity."
13. "Unmarried couples," as used in this note, only refers to opposite-sex unmarried couples.
There are also cases dealing with cohabitants who are not unmarried heterosexual couples, but who
are of the same sex, or are unrelated, who have been refused apartment rental and who have claimed
protection under state marital status discrimination prohibition provisions. See, e.g., Neuman, supra
note 10, at 972-75, 996-99 (discussing County of Dane v. Norman, 497 N.W.2d 714 (Wis. 1993)
(regarding a landlord who refused to rent a duplex to three unrelated women in one instance, and
to a woman with two children who would be sharing the duplex with another single adult in another
instance)).
Additionally, many males and females who choose to cohabit in a "more than platonic sense"
while not marrying may do so for financial reasons (i.e. students). Some of these persons are
young, but some of them are older, as well. For example, an elderly couple may cohabit because
one or both of them may lose pension checks or other forms of income if they remarry. See, e.g.,
20 C.F.R. § 404.331(c) (1996) (stating that a divorced spouse does not qualify for the spouse's
social security benefits if the former remarries); 20 C.F.R. §404.335(e) (1996) (stating that the
widow or widower of a person who was fully insured under the social security program is not
eligible for benefits unless he or she is unmarried, or remarried after reaching 60 years old and if
other factors are present).
14. See Smith, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 397; Donahue v. Fair Employment & Hous. Comm'n, 2
Cal. Rptr. 2d 32, 33 n. 1 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991). The landlord in Donahue stated that her religion
teaches that intercourse outside of marriage is a mortal sin, for which the sinner would go to hell
unless the sin were forgiven before death. Id. at 33 n.1. She also believed that it was sinful to aid
another in the commission of a sin. Id. While some religious landlords object to fornication, others
object to mere cohabitation. See, e.g., Swanner, 874 P.2d at 276-77 (concerning a landlord who
believed that even a non-sexual living arrangement by roommates of the opposite sex is immoral and
sinful because such an arrangement suggests the appearance of immorality); Desilets, 636 N.E.2d
at 234-35 (involving landlords who had a policy that they would not rent apartments to anyone who
engaged in conduct which violated their religious principles; as Roman Catholics, the landlords
believed that they should not facilitate sinful conduct, including fornication); Cooper, 460 N.W.2d
at 3-4 (concerning landlords who stated that they would not have rented to the unmarried couple
even if the couple did not have sexual relations on the property because living together constitutes
the "appearance of evil"); Jasniowski, No. 94 CH 5546 at I (involving a landlord who believed that
God had made him steward over his business and property, and as such he could not allow his
business or property to be used for immoral purposes).
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Twenty-one state legislatures and the District of Columbia have begun to address
this problem by amending their fair housing legislation to preclude marital status
discrimination. 5 As a result, couples living in one of these states 6 can bring
a claim against the landlord for discrimination. 7 However, the ability to bring
a cause of action does not ensure success. Unmarried couples face problems in
court as judges grapple with interpretation of the marital status discrimination
statutes and with ambiguous legislative intent. 8 More importantly, another
hurdle unmarried couples face is that courts are allowing anti-discrimination
statutes to be circumvented by landlords' claims of the free exercise of their
religion. Landlords argue that their right to freely exercise their religion, as
protected by the First .Amendment and more particularly by the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA),' 9 precludes them from complying with such
statutes and allows them to discriminate among their tenants based on marital

status.
This Note focuses upon the problem that RFRA is enabling landlords to
employ their rights of free exercise 0 to justify discrimination against
prospective tenants who are unmarried couples, despite legislative efforts to
prevent such discrimination. 2' Section II of this Note will explain the evolution
of the Supreme Court's analysis of free exercise doctrine and the circumstances
which motivated the passage of RFRA.22 Section III will then discuss how the
Supreme Court's recent decisions and ultimately the passage of RFRA have

15. These states include: Alaska, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii,
Illinois, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, New Hampshire, New Jersey,
New York, North Dakota, Oregon, Rhode Island, Vermont, Washington, and Wisconsin. See infra
note 130 for citations and examples of such statutes. In general, existing fair housing legislation
prohibits discrimination based on race, sex, age, handicap or familial status in the sale or rental of
housing. See, e.g., infra notes 130, 304, 306-07 and statutes cited in note 254.
16. See supra note 15.
17. This claim would be grounded in state law. See infra note 130 for a representative
provision.
18. See infra note 130.
19. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to 2000bb-4 (1994). RFRA is legislation which Congress passed to
supplement the constitutional protection of the free exercise of religion. See infra notes 88-114 and
accompanying text.
20. The right to the free exercise of religion is grounded in the First Amendment's Free
Exercise Clause. This provision states that "Congress shall make no law ... prohibiting the free
exercise [of religion] . . . ." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
21. Most of these statutes do not explicitly define "marital status" to include unmarried couples.
Matthew J. Smith, Comment, The Wages of Living in Sin: Discriminationin Housing Against
UnmarriedCouples, 25 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1055, 1074-75 (1992). However, only in Connecticut
and Oregon did the legislatures explicitly exclude unmarried couples from inclusion under "marital
status." Id. Illinois, Maryland, Minnesota and the District of Columbia defined "marital status,"
but did not include or exclude unmarried couples. Id. at 1075-76. The other sixteen states did not
define "marital status." Id.at 1076.
22. See infra notes 28-120 and accompanying text.
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strengthened landlords' likelihood of success in arguing that their free exercise
of religion is burdened by marital status discrimination laws.23 Section IV will
then argue that prohibiting discrimination in housing based on marital status is
not a substantial burden on landlords' free exercise of religion, and additionally,
that preventing discrimination is a compelling governmental interest, despite
some courts' decisions to the contrary. 4 Section V will recommend that the
Fair Housing Act (FHA) be amended to proscribe discrimination against
unmarried couples in housing, but explains that such an amendment alone will
fail to adequately solve the problem faced by unmarried cohabitants32 The
reason for this failure is that while laws which prevent discrimination against
unmarried couples are not a substantial burden on landlords' exercise of
religion, and protecting these tenants' rights to housing is a compelling interest,
lower courts are still ruling against unmarried cohabitants. These courts are
giving too much deference to RFRA because of their reliance on some of the
Supreme Court's free exercise jurisprudence. Section V will also show how
existing provisions in the FHA may influence the efficacy of such an
amendment. 26 Finally, Section VI will propose two amendments: the first to
the federal FHA to prohibit discrimination against unmarried couples in housing;
and the second, an amendment to RFRA to prevent landlords from utilizing that
Act as a defense to acts of discrimination prohibited by the FHA. 27 This
second amendment is necessary to avoid RFRA's imputed effect by evidencing
Congress' intent to prohibit marital status discrimination in housing.

II. BACKGROUND OF FREE EXERCISE JURISPRUDENCE
AND LEGISLATION

A. Development of the Supreme Court's Free Exercise Jurisprudence
The First Amendment's Free Exercise Clause28 protects citizens from
interference by the government in the exercise of their religious beliefs. 9 The

23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
CONST.

See infra notes 121-51 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 152-298 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 299-328 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 308-24 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 329-48 and accompanying text.
"Congress shall make no law ... prohibiting the free exercise [of religion) ....
amend. I.

"

U.S.

29. RONALD B. FLOWERS, THAT GODLESS COURT"?: SUPREME COURT DECISIONS ON CHURCH-

STATE RELATIONSHIPS 132 (1994). Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 902-03 (1990)
(O'Connor, J., concurring). See, e.g., Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 699-700 (1986) ("The Free
Exercise Clause affords an individual protection from certain forms of governmental compulsion.
... "). See also THOMAS P. FERGUSON, CATHOLIC AND AMERICAN: THE POLITICAL THEOLOGY
OF JOHN COURTNEY MURRAY 95 (1993) (noting that the First Amendment limits the state's power
and thus preserves the Church's ability to exercise its authority over the spiritual aspects of society);
ROBERT T. MILLER & RONALD B. FLOWERS, TOWARD BENEVOLENT NEUTRALITY:
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Supreme Court's exploration of the reach of the Free Exercise Clause of the
First Amendment did not truly begin until 1940, when Cantwell v.
Connecticul was decided. Some cases did reach the Supreme Court before
this time, but only rarely, because states were the entities burdening citizens'
free exercise rights. 31 Because the Free Exercise Clause did not yet extend to
prohibit states' actions, cases claiming violations of the right of free exercise of
religion began and failed in state courts. 32 It was not until the Court's decision
in Cantwel 33 that the Court decided that the reach of the Free Exercise Clause
extended to protect infringement of the exercise of religion by the states.' The
religious claimants whose cases did reach the Supreme Court were not
successful, so the "reach" of the Free Exercise Clause was not very broad.'
In 1963, however, the Free Exercise Clause's limited protection was enlarged
by the Court's decision in Sherbert v. Verner.' Not only was this the first
case in which the Court determined that the Free Exercise Clause protected the
claimant's exercise of religion, 37 but in this case the Supreme Court set down

STATE, AND THE SUPREME COURT 4 (3d ed. 1987) ("[The national government was thus denied any

power to interfere with the free exercise of religion . . ").
30. 310 U.S. 296 (1940). The Supreme Court began to explore the reach of the Free Exercise
Clause before 1940, but its "reach" did not include the protection of the religious adherents' actions.
John T. Noonan, Jr., The End of Free Exercise?, 42 DEPAUL L. REV. 567, 571 & n.21 (1992).
31. ROBERT T. MILLER & RONALD B. FLOWERS, TOWARD BENEVOLENT NEUTRALITY:
CHURCH, STATE, AND THE SUPREME COURT 57-58 (1977)
32. Id.
33. 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
34. Id. at 303-04; FLOWERS, supra note 29, at 57-58. In Cantwell v. Connecticut, the Court
held that not only was there constitutional protection for the exercise of religion, but that the states
were bound by this protection, as well, through the incorporation doctrine of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 303-04. FLOWERS, supra note 29, at 23-24 (explaining that
the decision in Cantwell v. Connecticut broadened the religious liberty of all religious groups
because it protected them from governmental prior restraint). Before 1940, three cases were brought
by members of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, all resulting in the Court's rejection
of their arguments for religious freedom. Noonan, supra note 30, at 571 & n.21. These cases
include: Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878) (holding that a polygamist was not allowed
a free exercise exemption from a law prohibiting polygamy); Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day
Saints v. United States, 136 U.S. 1 (1890) (holding that the Free Exercise Clause did not protect
the proclamation of the practice of polygamy); and Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333 (1890) (same).
Id.
35. JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 17.6, at 1282 (5th
ed. 1995). The only protection granted to the exercise of religion before 1963 was the expression
of religious beliefs. Id. In 1963, the Court first granted protection to religiously-motivated conduct
by its decision in Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963). Id.
36. 374 U.S. at 398. See, e.g., Stuart G. Parsell, Note, Revitalization of the Free Exercise of
Religion Under State Constitutions: A Response to Employment Division v. Smith, 68 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 747, 749 (1993).
37. See infra note 57 (listing the only cases in which religious claimants have won their cases).
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the framework for analysis of the Free Exercise Clause for nearly three
decades. 3
In Sherbert, the claimant was discharged by her employer because she
would not work on Saturday, which was the Sabbath Day of her faith. 39 She
was subsequently denied unemployment compensation because it was determined
that she did not have "good cause" to reject the work offered her.4 The
claimant then contended that this denial of benefits was a violation of her right
to the free exercise of her religion. 4' The Sherbert Court held that the
government could only impose a substantial burden 4 on a person's free
exercise of religion if it had a "compelling interest" in the action which created
the burden and if that action was the least restrictive means to achieve the
governmental interest .4 ' A "compelling interest" is the strongest interest which
the Supreme Court requires the government to show in justification of its
action." To have a "compelling interest," the government must demonstrate
that "no showing merely of a rational relationship to some colorable state
interest would suffice; in this highly sensitive constitutional area, '[o]nly the
gravest abuses, endangering paramount interests, give occasion for permissible

38. The analysis under the Free Exercise Clause did not change substantially until 27 years
later-in 1990 with Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
39. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 399.
40. Id. at 401.
41. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 401 (1963).
42. A "substantial burden" is one which is legally cognizable. Rod M. Fliegel, FreeExercise
Fidelity and the Religious FreedomRestoration Act of 1993: Where We Are, Where We Have Been,
and Where We Are Going, 5 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 39, 64 (1994). Generally, it is a burden on
religion by the state or federal government which is sufficient to trigger free exercise protection.
Id. See infra notes 159-91 and accompanying text.
43. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 407. To show that the action is the least restrictive means, the
government should "demonstrate that no alternative forms of regulation would combat such abuses
without infringing First Amendment rights." Id.
44. Examples of interests which the Supreme Court has found to be "compelling" are indicative
of the type of justification whith the Court requires. In United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 258,
260 (1982), the Court found that mandatory participation in the social security tax system was a
compelling interest due to the comprehensive social benefits which the system provided and that
maintaining a sound tax system required mandatory participation. In Bob Jones University v. United
States, 461 U.S. 574, 580, 604 (1983), the Court held that the government's interest in eradicating
racial discrimination in education was compelling and thus justified infringement of petitioners'
religious beliefs that the Bible prohibits interracial dating and marriage. The Court also found a
compelling interest in Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986). In Goldman, the claimantwas
refused an exemption from the military dress regulations which forbade wearing yarmulkes due to
the government's compelling interest in promoting the military's group identity and obedience to
authority. Id. at 508-10.
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limitation.'"' Only upon a showing of a compelling interest can something as
important as a fundamental right be infringed.'
Religious adherents' claims are brought to light by their request that a court
grant them an exemption from complying with a law.47 The adherents argue
that the law unconstitutionally burdens their exercise of religion. Exemptions
are thus the judicial mechanism by which religious claimants' beliefs are allowed
to exempt them from the application of a law.48 For religious claimants to be
granted an exemption 49 from a burdensome law under the Sherbert
interpretation of free exercise jurisprudence, they must show a religious belief
which is sincerely held,5' the exercise of this religious belief must be
substantially burdened, 5 and the government must fail to meet the requirements
which justify the imposition of the substantial burden upon the claimants'
exercise of religion.5"
If a court grants an exemption, the law remains valid

45. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 406 (quoting Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945)).
46. Under the compelling interest test, religious freedom is the rule and governmental
interference is the exception. FLOWERS, supra note 29, at 129.
47. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972). In Yoder, the claimants were Amish
parents who sought to be exempt from the state law which required that their children attend high
school, contrary to their beliefs which required that they avoid 'worldly' influences. Id. at 208-09.
48. NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 35, § 17.6, at 1282.
49. A "free exercise exemption" is essentially the equivalent of a "free exercise defense." A
"free exercise defense" refers to a person seeking relief from a government requirement. When the
defense has succeeded in relieving that person from the requirement, the court grants that person an
"exemption." See Rebecca A. Wistner, Note, Cohabitation, Fornicationand the FreeExercise of
Religion: Landlords Seeking Religious Exemption from Fair Housing Laws, 46 CASE W. RES. L.
REV. 1071, 1071-72 (1996).
50. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 215-19; Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 713-18 (1981). A
reviewing court is limited to determining whether the religious belief which motivates the conduct
is sincerely held. Id. at 716. The belief is considered to be sincere if the claimant honestly believes
that his or her religion requires or forbids the subsequent action. Id. Sincerity is a different issue
from the validity of a person's religious belief, which the Supreme Court has held is not for judicial
examination. United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 184 (1965) ("The validity of what [the
claimant] believes cannot be questioned. Some theologians ... might be tempted to question the
existence of the [claimant's] 'Supreme Being' or the truth of his concepts. But these are inquiries
foreclosed to Government."). See also United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78 (1944). In Ballard,
the claimants proclaimed to have healing powers and solicited money through the mails in return for
their healing services. Id. at 79. The Court held that the Free Exercise Clause correctly prevented
the jury at trial from considering the question of the truth or falsity of the claimants' religious
beliefs. Id. at 88.
51. See infra notes 159-91 and accompanying text for a discussion of "substantial burden."
52. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406-07 (1963). These requirements are a compelling
governmental interest and least restrictive means. Id.; Yoder, 406 U.S. at 214. See also Markey,
supranote 10, at 706; JESSE H. CHOPER, SECURING RELIGIOUS LIBERTY: PRINCIPLES FOR JUDICIAL
INTERPRETATION OF THE RELIGION CLAUSES 54 (1995).
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as against all other citizens, while the religious claimants are exempt from
complying with the law. 3
The compelling interest test was used by the Supreme Court in its analysis
of the Free Exercise Clause for twenty-seven years after the test was first
established in Sherbert v. Verner.' Though the language of the test imposes
a very high burden upon the government which would seem to favor the
religious claimant, in only five cases has the Court held that the Free Exercise
55
Clause warranted an exemption which protected religious adherents' behavior.
This seeming inconsistency between the strict requirements under the test and
the infrequency with which the test actually served to protect religiouslymotivated conduct prompted the Court to alter its analysis under the Free
Exercise Clause.56
B. A Change in the Supreme Court's Free Exercise Jurisprudence
After deciding many cases further refining the protection of the Free
Exercise Clause, 7 the Supreme Court significantly altered its free exercise
jurisprudence in 1990 with its decision in Employment Division v. Smith.58 In
Smith, two employees of a private drug rehabilitation organization were fired
because they ingested a hallucinogenic drug called peyote.59 The employees'

53. CHOPER, supra note 52, at 54.
54. James J. Musial, Free Exercise in the 90's: In the Wake of Employment Div., Dep't of
Human Resources v. Smith, 4 TEMP. POL. & Civ. RTs. L. REV. 15, 21 (1994).
55. Markey, supra note 10, at 735.
56. See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 883-88 (1990).
57. To name just a few, in 1972 the Court held that the right to the free exercise of religion
exempted Amish children from the state's public high school education requirement. Wisconsin v.
Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972). In three other cases dealing with a similar situation as in Sherbert v.
Verner, the Court held that those claimants' right to free exercise of religion exempted them from
being denied unemployment compensation. Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Employment Sec. Div.,
450 U.S. 707, 718-19 (1981); Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n of Fla., 480 U.S. 136
(1987); Frazee v. Illinois Dep't of Employment Sec., 489 U.S. 829 (1989). These three cases,
including Sherbert v. Verner, comprise what is sometimes called the "Sherbert Quartet." These four
cases, in addition to Wisconsin v. Yoder, are the only cases in which the religious adherent has
prevailed. Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, The Vulnerability of Conscience: The
Constitutional Basis for Protecting Religious Conduct, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 1245, 1277-81 & nn.5769 (1994). They all deal with the state's denial of unemployment benefits to employees who were
unable to perform employment obligations as a result of their religious beliefs. Id. In United States
v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982), the Court held that the Free Exercise Clause does not exempt the
Amish from the payment of social security taxes. Id. at 261. And in Hernandez v. Commissioner
of Internal Revenue, 490 U.S. 680 (1989), the Court held that denying religious claimants a tax
deduction for fixed payments for auditing and training services did not violate their right to free
exercise of religion. Id. at 700.
58. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
59. Id. at 874.
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use of peyote was prohibited by Oregon's controlled substance law, even though
its use was important to the employees' practice of their religion.'
The

employees were denied unemployment compensation because they were fired for6

their religious use of a drug, which was considered work-related misconduct. 1
The employees contended that Oregon's drug law did not apply to them because
their use of peyote was religiously motivated.' Thus, the employees brought
suit claiming that their free exercise of religion had been substantially
burdened.'
The Smith Court held that the test for a free exercise defense was the
"incidental effects" test" instead of the "compelling interest" test of Sherbert
v. Verner.' According to the Smith Court, laws which have an "incidental
effect" on a person's exercise of religion do not violate the Free Exercise Clause
if they are "neutral" and "generally applicable."'
To hiave an "incidental"
effect upon the exercise of religion, the object of the law must not be to prohibit
the exercise of religion.67 A law is "neutral" if its purpose is not to "infringe
upon or restrict practices because of their religious motivation."6" In contrast,
a law is "generally applicable" if it applies generally to all similarly situated

60. Id. In fact, the two employees' use of peyote was equivalent in its importance to the
exercise of their religion as the taking of Communion is to other faiths. Id. ("Mhey ingested peyote
for sacramental purposes at a ceremony of the Native American Church, of which both are
members.").
61. Id.
62. Id.at 878.
63. Id.at 874-77.
64. "[I]f prohibiting the exercise of religion .. is not the object of the [governmental act] but
merely the incidental effect of a generally applicable [law] ... the First Amendment has not been
offended." Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 878 (1990).
65. 374 U.S. 398 (1963). "Compelling interest" seems to be the universal parlance for the
Supreme Court's test in the free exercise arena, though the requirement of a "compelling interest"
is actually a component of the "strict scrutiny" test. Id. See CHOPER, supra note 52, at 54. The
other component is that the "least restrictive means" be used or that the law be "narrowly tailored."
Id. As used in this note and as in nearly all commentary on this topic, the "compelling interest" test
denotes the "strict scrutiny" test as a whole.
66. Smith, 494 U.S. at 878; Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Haileah, 508
U.S. 520, 522 (1993).
67. Smith, 494 U.S. at 878.
68. Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 523. If a law is enacted "because of" a particular religious practice,
instead of "in spite of" a particular religious practice, it is not neutral. Id. at 540-41. There are
two parts to "neutrality." The first test of the neutrality of a law is whether it is neutral on its face:
whether by looking at the text itself or context of the text of the law it can be determined that the
purpose of the law was to infringe upon a particular religious group. Id. at 534. The final
component of neutrality is whether the law is neutral in its application, or if the effect the law has
upon various people indicates that the purpose of the law was to infringe upon religious practices.
Id. at 534-35.
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people without targeting any particular religion or religious activity69 or if it
equally regulates secular and religious conduct.7' If a law is underinclusive
with regard to the categories of people it applies to, and these unincluded
persons also fall within the parameters of the law's supposed goal, then the law
is not generally applicable. 7' The distinction between "neutral" and "generally
applicable" may appear unclear at times, but this lack of clarity results because
the two concepts are interrelated. 2 In fact, as the Court indicated in Church
of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah,' a case decided three years

after Employment Division v. Smith, 4 the failure to satisfy one of the prongs
is a "likely indication" that the other is not satisfied.75

69. Wendy K. Olin, Note, Constitutional Survival Camp: What Are the Chances That the
General Applicability Test Will Make It?, 68 S. CAL. L. REv. 1029, 1030 (1995); NOWAK &
ROTUNDA, supra note 35, § 17.6, at 1280 (explaining that a law is "generally applicable" if it
applies to all persons-or to a class of persons which is not defined by religious
characteristics-when they act or refrain from acting).
70. Fliegel, supra note 42, at 64.
71. Lukurmi, 508 U.S. at 543.
72. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 531-32 (1993).
A hypothetical may assist in understanding the distinction between the two concepts of "neutrality"
and "general applicability." Suppose a legislature proposes a law which forbids the consumption
of alcohol at public gatherings where food is not served. Additionally, suppose that the legislative
history indicated that the legislature's only purpose in passing such a statute was to alleviate the
problem of drunk driving, which it deemed to be more acute when large groups of people were
congregated and when there was no consumption of food at the time of the consumption of alcohol.
Such a law would appear to prohibit the taking of Communion in church. Examining this
hypothetical law for its neutrality would result in a conclusion that it is "neutral," assuming that
there was no evidence whatsoever that the legislation had the purpose or effect of targeting the
religious use of alcohol. This hypothetical law may not be "generally applicable," however, because
there are other categories of persons which the law excludes, which otherwise would seem to fit
within the legislature's stated goal. Examples of these other categories would be people who go to
bars-who may end up becoming very drunk-where only token amounts of food may be served,
which do not significantly counteract the consumption of alcohol; and attendees of social functions
where alcohol is served, in addition to hors d'oeuvres, which would impair the driving of many of
the guests.
73. 508 U.S. at 520. Lukumi involved a city in Florida whose city council passed ordinances
which subjected to criminal punishment those who unnecessarily or cruelly killed animals. Id. at
526. These ordinances were aimed at members of the Santeria religion who had recently begun to
establish a church in the community. Id. at 526-27. The Santeria faith practiced animal sacrifice,
and this concerned many residents. Id. at 525-26. The Lukumi Court held that these ordinances
were contrary to the Free Exercise Clause under Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872
(1990), because they were neither neutral nor generally applicable. Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 542. As
such, to satisfy the Free Exercise Clause, they had to satisfy the compelling interest test and the
Lukumi Court held that they did not. Id. at 546.
74. 494 U.S. at 872.
75. Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 531.
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The incidental effects test is equivalent in its stringency to the rational basis
test,76 so that neutral and generally applicable laws which burden religion do
not have a difficult hurdle to satisfy to be constitutional.' The Court reasoned
in Smith7" that doing away with the compelling interest test for religion-neutral
and generally applicable laws was the only appropriate analysis considering the
Court's view of its precedents.' The Court determined that to continue to use

76. The "rational basis test" determines whether there is a rational relationship to a legitimate
state interest. Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. 221 (1981).
77. Smith, 494 U.S. at 885-86, 888-89. See, e.g., Markey, supra note 10, at 735; Tania
Saison, Restoring Obscurity: The Shortcomings of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 28
COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 653, 676 (1995).
78. Scalia, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist, C.J., and White, Stevens
and Kennedy, J.J., joined. Smith, 494 U.S. at 873.
79. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 886 n.3 (1990). While many scholars challenge
the Smith Court's analysis of the issue which was before it and its interpretation of free exercise
precedent, the arguments that the Court presented for altering the test for a free exercise exemption
are still worth consideration-especially when examining marital status discrimination in housing.
The majority in Smith had three primary justifications for doing away with the compelling interest
test. First, the Court admitted that it had not actually been applying the test in many free exercise
claims which came before it. Id. at 883-84. The Court believed that it was time that it articulated
a test which it actually utilized. Id. at 883. In reality, the Court had only applied the compelling
interest test on four occasions since its creation in 1963, and three of those concerned state
unemployment compensation cases. Id. While Justice Scalia said that the Court had purported to
use the test in other cases, it had always found the test "satisfied." Id. Indeed, the government has
prevailed in every free exercise exemption case before the Supreme Court other than the Sherbert
Quartet and Yoder. Markey, supra note 10, at 735. Secondly, the Court stated that the compelling
interest test was not appropriate for freedom of religion cases because inquiring into the "centrality"
of religious beliefs was a prerequisite for the test. Smith, 494 U.S. at 886-87. This, Justice Scalia
said, was not proper for the judiciary to do, nor was it capable of such a task. Id. Such an analysis
would be akin to inquiring into the relative importance of speech when applying the strict scrutiny
test to free speech claims. Id. at 887. However, this is arguably already done. Some forms of
speech are considered to be so lacking in social utility that they are barely awarded First Amendment
protection. Harry Kalven, The Metaphysics of the Law of Obscenity, 1960 SuP. CT. REV. 1, 11;
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942). Perhaps Justice Scalia was referring to the
fact that a majority of the Court has never explicitly admitted that free speech protections are
WILLIAM B. LOCKHART ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES,
arranged hierarchically.
COMMENTS, QUESTIONS § 31, at 832 (7th ed. 1991). Nevertheless, doing away with a centrality
inquiry is "unworkable" because that would require applying the compelling interest test equally to
a minor religious act such as throwing rice at church weddings as well as the much more religious
act of actually getting married in a church. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 887. The third reason, and the
most crucial one here, is that the Court concluded that exempting persons from the application of
generally applicable laws for religious reasons would have a disastrous impact upon social order as
the courts decided more cases. Id. at 885, 888. The majority reasoned that if the courts used the
compelling interest test and granted various claimants exemptions, people would claim exemptions
from nearly every civic obligation imaginable. Id. at 888. As it has been estimated approximately
800 different organized religions have existed during this century, it is not far outside the realm of
possibility that at least one of the religion's doctrines might object to nearly every law. See
CHOPER, supra note 52, at 67 n.52 (citing J. Gordon Melton, Another Look at New Religions, 527
ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 97 (May 1993)).
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the higher standard would "make the professed doctrines of religious belief
superior to the laws of the land, and in effect permit every citizen to become a
law unto himself. "'
As the analysis under the Free Exercise Clause has changed, so has the
likelihood of obtaining an exemption. In contrast to being able to seek an
exemption from burdensome laws under the Sherbert v. Verner"t compelling
interest framework, a religious claimant would not be able to receive an
exemption from a burdensome law after the Court's decision in Smith.' The
Smith Court held that the Free Exercise Clause did not require an exemption for
a person whose religious beliefs are burdened by laws as long as the laws are
facially neutral, generally applicable and rationally related to a legitimate state
interest.' The Free Exercise Clause now provides no recourse for a claimant
whose exercise of religion is burdened if the law meets the requirements of
Smith. Only if the law is not neutral or generally applicable is the claimant able
to avoid the burdensome law, and in such cases, the law is held to be invalid for
all purposes rather than the claimant being individually exempt from it.'

80. Smith, 494 U.S. at 879. The Court mentioned a host of universally applicable duties,
ranging from compulsory military service, to payment of taxes, to health and safety regulations such
as manslaughter and child neglect laws, child labor laws, environmental protection laws and
minimum wage laws from which people have sought religious exemptions under the compelling
interest test. Id. at 888-89. The Smith decision does, however, provide for three exceptions to its
application of the "incidental effects" test. If a future free exercise case would fit within one of
these three categories, the government's interest would be subjected to the "compelling interest" test
instead of the "incidental effects" test. Id. at 878, 881-84. The first exception is for laws which
are not neutral and generally applicable, but instead intended to single out religion. Id. at 878. The
second exception is for cases in which a fundamental right, such as freedom of speech or
association, or a parent's right to determine her child's upbringing or religion, is intertwined with
the free exercise of religion. Id. at 881. This was how the Court distinguished its precedent of
denying free exercise exemptions from its holding in Wisconsin v. Yoder, in which the claimants
were granted an exemption. Id. at 881-82. This exception is known as a "hybrid situation." Id.
at 882. The third exception includes cases with facts similar to Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398
(1963), which involved denial of unemployment compensation because of religious activity. Smith,
874 U.S. at 882-83. The justification for subjecting these cases to the compelling interest test is that
the system of unemployment compensation already provides for "individualized governmental
assessment of the reasons for the relevant conduct." Id. at 884. The Court then distinguished Smith
from Sherbert by stating that the former involved conduct which was prohibited by Oregon's
criminal law: the use of drugs. Id. at 876.
81. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
82. Smith, 494 U.S. at 890.
83. Id. The Court framed Oregon's interest as prohibiting "socially harmful conduct." Id. at
885.
84. See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993). In
Lukumi, the challenged ordinances were invalidated because they targeted a particular group's
religious practices. Id. at 547.
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Thus, because the drug laws at issue in Smith were neutral and generally
applicable, the claimants could be denied unemployment compensation for the
religious ingestion of peyote.u
The Supreme Court's elimination of the compelling interest test from its
Free Exercise Clause landscape prompted religious and constitutional scholars
They feared that the
to contemplate the implications of such a ruling.'
incidental effects test inadequately protected religiously-motivated actions.'
These scholars hoped that the Supreme Court would reconsider its Smith holding
in future cases, but that did not occur. As a result, these scholars have turned
to the legislative branch to address their concerns for the protection of religious

actions.
C. Congress' Response to the Supreme Court's Change in Free Exercise
Analysis
The pragmatic effect of Employment Division v. Smith was to weaken the
constitutional protection of conduct motivated by religionA Before Smith, the
language of the test guiding the Supreme Court's analysis of the Free Exercise
Clause granted the government limited power to infringe upon religious
activity.89 Even though the Court only granted four claimants exemptions after
Sherbert v. Verner,' the phrasing of the test was rigorous.9 1 After Smith,

85. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 878, 890 (1990). Alan Ides, The Text of the
Free Exercise Clause as a Measure of Employment Division v. Smith and the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act, 51 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 135, 135 (1994). Oregon later created a legislative
exemption for the religious ingestion of peyote. Id. at 135 n.6 (citing OR. REV. STAT. § 475.992(5)
(1991)). Although the Smith Court held that the Constitution did not require religious exemptions
from neutral and generally applicable laws, the Court encouraged Congress and state legislatures to
create exemptions from laws for particular religious activities. Smith, 494 U.S. at 890. The Court
felt that the risk that minority religions face in not having the political strength to lobby legislatures
for statutory exemptions was an "unavoidable consequence" of living in a democratic society with
a wide variety of religious beliefs. Id.
86. See generally Douglas Laycock, Summary & Synthesis: The Crisis in Religious Liberty, 60
GEO. WASH. L. REv. 841 (1992).
87. FLOWERS, supra note 29, at 133.
88. See Markey, supra note 10, at 735. This was accomplished by reducing the standard of
review for free exercise claims from strict scrutiny to rational basis. Id. See also Olin, supra note
69, at 1046-47 (explaining that a claimant's arguments against burdensome laws are irrelevant if the
laws are neutral and generally applicable).
89. FLOWERS, supra note 29, at 130.
90. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
91. NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 35, § 17.6, at 1282.
Although [the] Court['s] . . . test read as if the Supreme Court would give significant
protection to religiously motivated actions, the Court ruled . . . against persons seeking a
religiously based exemption from any law of general applicability in every area except two:
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however, the government was given more latitude to pass laws which impact
religious activity.' This result shocked and distressed a sizable portion of the
public.'
Congress was also disappointed by what it considered to be the
Supreme Court's emasculation of the Free Exercise Clause and the disrespect
that Smith evidenced for the United States' history of religious freedom and
protection.' In direct response to Smith, and with great support from a wide

unemployment eligibility requirements and compulsory school attendance for Amish
children of high school age.
Id. Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, Why the Religious Freedom Restoration Act
is Unconstitutional, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 437, 446-47 ("In other constitutional areas, the compelling
state interest test has been an all but insurmountable barrier, 'strict in theory and fatal in fact,'
(quoting Gerald Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Foreward: In Search of Evolving
Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8
(1972)) but, in pre-Smith religious exemption cases, it was 'strict in theory but feeble in fact.'"
(quoting Eisgruber & Sager, supra note 57, at 1247).
92. FLOWERS, supra note 29, at 130. Professor Flowers believes that the courts are best suited
to protect minority religious interests against the rule of the majority, yet in Smith the Supreme
Court abdicated its role-and the role of courts across the country-in protecting minority religions.
Id. at 132. Flowers echoes the sentiments of Justice O'Connor in her concurrence in Smith.
Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 902-03 (1990). See CHOPER, supra note 52, at 56, who
similarly argues that legislatures are not adequate sources of protection for individual constitutional
rights. Choper bases this conclusion on his beliefs that legislatures can be insensitive, or even
hostile, to minority religions; and that legislatures can be unaware of minority religions if they are
obscure or poorly organized. Id.
93. James E. Ryan, Note, Smith and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act: An Iconoclastic
Assessment, 78 VA. L. REV. 1407, 1409 (1992). Members of the media, academia, Congress, and
religious groups responded with incredulity, anger and despair. Id. For example, the Los Angeles
Times wrote that the Smith decision was "an exercise of 'pure legal adventurism.'" Id. An article
by Professor and Dean Edward M. Gaffney et al., described Smith as a "sweeping disaster for
religious liberty." Id. And the Congressmember who proposed RFRA said that "[wlith the stroke
of a pen, the Supreme Court has virtually removed religious freedom from the Bill of Rights." Id.
at 1409-10. Part of the dissatisfaction with Smith is due to what some say is its poor craftsmanship.
Markey, supra note 10, at 727-28. Other critics say that the decision is also an example of
.careless, misleading and often downright erroneous use of precedent." Id. at 732; Smith, 494
U.S. at 900, 903 (O'Connor, J., concurring). See, e.g., Musial, supranote 54, at 41-47. Professor
Michael W. McConnell is a well-known critic of the Smith decision. Id. at 41. Some of Professor
McConnell's criticisms of Smith are that the Court disregarded the text of the Free Exercise Clause,
that the Smith Court ignored the history of the Clause that would indicate the Clause's favoring of
broader free exercise exemptions than that which Smith allowed, and that the Court misused
precedent. Id. at 42-43. See Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and the Smith
Decision, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1109 (1990), for a more thorough examination of Professor
McConnell's criticisms of the Smith decision. Cf. William P. Marshall, In Defense of Smith and
Free Exercise Revisionism, 58 U. CHL. L. REV. 308 (1991) (explaining Mr. Marshall's opinion that
even though Smith may be neither persuasive, nor well-written, and is indicative of a shallow
understanding of free exercise jurisprudence, the Court was right to abandon the compelling interest
standard and to question religious exemption analysis).
94. Ryan, supra note 93, at 1409-12. Smith also caused some state courts' departures from the
Supreme Court's free exercise analysis. See infra notes 133-37 and accompanying text.

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1997

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 31, No. 3 [1997], Art. 6

1032

VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 31

spectrum of the religious community,' Congress enacted a statutory reaffirmation of the free exercise analysis that the Supreme Court had used prior
to Smith.' This statute was called the Religious Freedom Restoration Act
(RFRA).97 RFRA reinstated free exercise jurisprudence prior to Smith by
mandating that government may only substantially burden a person's exercise of
religion if it has a compelling interest to justify the burden and if the regulation
is the least restrictive means possible to achieve that interest.9" RFRA does not
"overrule" the standard of review that the Supreme Court has established; a
claim brought under the Free Exercise Clause is still analyzed according to the

95. Ryan, supra note 93, at 1438. Support for this bill outside the legislature was definitely
not lacking. Id. In fact, a group called the Coalition for the Free Exercise of Religion was formed
explicitly to support the bill. Id. More than 35 organizations were part of this group, including the
American Civil Liberties Union, American Jewish Congress, General Conference of Seventh-Day
Adventists, the Baptist Joint Committee on Public Affairs, and the Native American Rights Fund.
Id. at 1438 & n.174.
96. Ryan, supra note 93, at 1411.
97. Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to bb-4 (1994)).
It took three years and several attempts by Congress to pass the bill, but ultimately, the Senate voted
for it unanimously and only three members of the House voted against it. President Clinton signed
it into law on November 16, 1993, stating that the bill was an example of Congress' "extraordinary"
power to "reverse by legislation a decision of the United States Supreme Court." Eisgruber & Sager,
supra note 91, at 438 (citing Remarks on Signing the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993,
29 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 2377 (Nov. 16, 1993)).
98. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-l(b) (1994). The Act provides in relevant part:
(a) Findings
The Congress finds that(1) the framers of the Constitution, recognizing free exercise of religion as an
unalienable right, secured its protection in the First Amendment to the Constitution;
(4) in Employment Division v. Smith the Supreme Court virtually eliminated the
requirement that the government justify burdens on religious exercise imposed by laws
neutral toward religion; and
(5) the compelling interest test as set forth in prior federal court rulings is a workable
test for striking sensible balances between religious liberty and competing prior
governmental interests.
Id. § 2000bb(a) (citations omitted).
(a) In general
Government shall not substantially burden a person's exercise of religion even if the
burden results from a rule of general applicability, except as provided in subsection (b)
of this section.
(b) Government may substantially burden a person's exercise of religion only if it
demonstrates that application of the burden to the person: (1) is in furtherance of a
compelling governmental interest; and (2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that
compelling governmental interest.
(c) A person whose religious exercise has been burdened in violation of this section may
assert that violation as a claim or defense in ajudicial proceeding and obtain appropriate
relief against a government. ...
Id. § 2000bb-l(a) to (c).
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"incidental effects" test of Smith.'
RFRA does, however, create a federal
statutory right, coexistent with and independent of the Free Exercise Clause,
which mirrors the Supreme Court's analysis prior to Smith. 100
The language of RFRA is indicative of how the Supreme Court's decision
in Smith was construed by Congress. In the section of RFRA which explains
Congress' findings, the language clearly indicates that the action of the Supreme
Court motivated the passage of RFRA. 0' The statute states that Employment
Division v. Smith had the effect of "virtually eliminat[ing]" the obligation of the
government to sufficiently justify its burden on religious activity."
Furthermore, Congress declared that its goal was to reinstate the compelling
interest test as it had been applied in Sherbert v. Verner"°3 and Wisconsin v.
Yoder. "
Finally, contrary to Justice Scalia's reasoning in Smith,"t 5
Congress declared the compelling interest test to be "workable" for free exercise
claims.l1

99. Fliegel, supra note 42, at 94. The separation of powers doctrine prohibits Congress from
overruling a Supreme Court decision. See infra notes 108-09 and accompanying text.
100. One must view this statutory right with caution, however. As it is statutory, RFRA can
be altered or eliminated in the same way that it was created. CHOPER, supra note 52, at 58; Thomas
C. Berg, What Hath Congress Wrought? An Interpretive Guide to the Religious Freedom Restoration
Act, 39 ViLL. L. REV. 1, 63-64 (1994).
101. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(a)(4) (1994). See supra note 98 for the text of this provision.
102. Id.
103. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
104. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b)(1) (1994) (citing Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972)).
Congress wanted to turn the Supreme Court's jurisprudential clock back one day: to the day before
Smith was decided. Markey, supra note 10, at 737. The goal of RFRA was thus to have the
compelling interest test "as set forth in Sherbert v. Verner and Wisconsin v. Yoder," applied to free
exercise cases. Id. (citations omitted). However, achieving this result is more complicated than it
sounds. The first reason is that the decisions in Sherbert and Yoder were the exceptions rather than
the rule-the claimants won instead of the government. Eisgruber & Sager, supra note 57, at 1307.
Also, the legislative history indicates that Congress intended for all of the pre-Smith decisional law
to be used for free exercise cases under RFRA-not just Sherbert and Yoder. Markey, supra note
10, at 738. The problem with this is that many believe that the pre-Sith decisions were "laced with
confusion and contradiction." Eisgruber & Sager, supra note 57, at 1307. It is admirable that
Congress wanted to strengthen the protection of the Free Exercise Clause, but due to the fact that
the free exercise decisions were so inconsistent, the pre-Smith cases give courts no improved
guidance. Id. The courts are placed right back into the middle of what is the compelling interest
confusion. Id. Exemplifying the confusion regarding the use of the compelling interest test, the
justices on the Sherbert Court were not even sure how to apply the test. Saison, supra note 77, at
666-67. In the Sherbert opinion, Justice Brennan, writing for the majority, believed that the burden
placed on the claimant in Braunfeld v. Brown was "less direct," justifying that the claimant was
unsuccessful in that case, while the claimant in Sherbert was successful. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 408
(citing Braunfield v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961)). Justice Stewart, in contrast, concluded in his
concurring opinion that the burden in Braunfeld was more onerous than that in Sherbert, though both
were sufficiently burdensome for the claimant's free exercise claim to prevail. Id.
105. See supra note 79.
106. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(a)(5) (1994).
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RFRA's constitutionality has been challenged since its passage.' °7 The
principle objection to RFRA's constitutionality is that it seems to be an attempt

by Congress to overrule a Supreme Court decision, contrary to the separation

of powers doctrine"0 8 and thus beyond Congress' authority to enforce the
Fourteenth Amendment. °" To date, the consensus among federal courts
which have addressed the issue is that RFRA is a constitutional act of

107. See generally Eisgruber & Sager, supra note 91 (arguing that RFRA is unconstitutional
because it violates principles of religious freedom, exceeds limits of federal authority, and asks the
Supreme Court to use a test it has abandoned); Eisgruber & Sager, supra note 57 (favoring the
interpretation of free exercise protection as protective while disfavoring the privileging interpretation
and putting RFRA in the latter category). RFRA's necessity and wisdom is also another fascinating
topic. See generally Ryan, supra note 93; Saison, supra note 77; Ides, supra note 85; Edward
McGlynn Gaffney et al., An Open Letter to the Religious Community, FIRST THINGS, Mar. 1991,
at 44. Unfortunately, the scope of this note is not broad enough to contain an in-depth discussion
of the constitutionality of RFRA, so its constitutionality will be presumed. Similarly, when the
constitutionality of RFRA is not directly at issue, courts presume its constitutionality. See, e.g.,
Abdul-Akbar v. Department of Corrections, 910 F. Supp. 986, 1008 (D. Del. 1995) ("There is a
question whether the RFRA is constitutional. However, the court will assume the constitutionality
of the RFRA for the sake of this decision.") (citation omitted).
108. See Eisgruber & Sager, supra note 91, at 441. For another discussion of the conflict
between RFRA and the separation of powers doctrine, see Joanne C. Brant, Taking the Supreme
Court at its Word: The Implicationsfor RFRA and Separation of Powers, 56 MONT. L. REV. 5
(1995) (arguing that RFRA violates the separation of powers doctrine because Congress has
undermined the most basic power of any branch of government: the power to determine its own
limitations).
109. P.F. Flores v. City of Boerne, 73 F.3d 1352, 1361 (5th Cir. 1996) (noting that the concept
of Section Five authority and the violation of the doctrine of separation of powers is interrelated:
if RFRA violates other constitutional provisions it violates Section Five authority). See, e.g.,
Eisgmber & Sager, supra note 91, at 460-69; Brant, supra note 108, at 31.
The constitutional authority for RFRA is Section Five of the 14th Amendment. Rex E. Lee,
The Religious FreedomRestorationAct: Legislative Choice and JudicialReview, 1993 BYU L. REV.
73, 90. This section gives Congress the power "to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the
provisions of this article." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5. The exact power that Section Five gives
Congress is far from a settled constitutional matter. Lee, supra, at 90-91. However, at least the
boundaries of the power are generally agreed upon. Id. at 91. Section Five definitely does not give
Congress authority to overrule any constitutional decision by the Supreme Court, but at a minimum
the Section allows Congress to enact what is known as "remedial" legislation, which builds upon
and strengthens existing constitutional rights. Id. For example, in Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S.
641 (1966), a New York law required persons who had completed the sixth grade in Puerto Rico
to complete a literacy test to be allowed to vote. Lee, supra, at 92-93. The Voting Rights Act of
1965 prohibited such literacy testing, even though the Supreme Court had previously held inLassiter
v. Northampton County Board of Elections, 360 U.S. 45 (1959), that literacy tests did not violate
the Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amendments. Lee, supra, at 93. In Karzenbach, the Supreme Court
held that the "extra protection"-beyond what the Constitution requires-of the Voting Rights Act
was constitutional. Id. One explanation for the Court's decision is that it is permissible for
Congress to require more, but not less, protection of a constitutional right than the Supreme Court
itself. Id.
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Congressional authority. "0 The district court for the Western District of
Texas.. had declared RFRA unconstitutional, but that decision was reversed
by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals."' Currently, the issue of RFRA's
constitutionality is before the Supreme Court in City of Boerne, Texas v.
Flores."' Unless and until the Court rules otherwise, for purposes of this
Note, RFRA will be presumed to be constitutional to the extent that it creates
a statutory right for those claiming infringement of their free exercise of
religion. 114
The practical effect of RFRA upon free exercise litigation will be to
strengthen the religious claimant's argument by triggering the compelling interest
test which would rarely have been invoked under Smith's interpretation of the
Free Exercise Clause. 115 However, the doctrinal effect of RFRA is not

110. Flores, 73 F.3d at 1356; Belgard v. Hawaii, 883 F. Supp. 510, 513 (D. Haw. 1995)
(finding that RFRA was a constitutional exercise of Congressional authority); State v. Miller, 538
N.W.2d 573, 577 (Wis. Ct. App. 1995) (same); Sasnett v. Department of Corrections, 891 F. Supp.
1305, 1320 (W.D. Wis. 1995) (same).
111. P.F. Flores v. City of Boerne, 877 F. Supp. 355, 358 (W.D. Tex. 1995) (finding that
RFRA was an unconstitutional change of the burden of proof established by Smith).
112. Flores, 73 F.3d at 1354.
113. Marcia Coyle, Court Upholds Clinic Zones, Hears Religion Case, NAT'L L.J., Mar. 3,
1997, at A9. Oral arguments in City of Boerne vs. Flores, No. 95-2074, were heard by the Court
on Feb. 19, 1997, and the decision is expected by early summer. Id. One of the issues before the
Court is whether Congress exceeded its power under § 5 of the 14th Amendment in passing RFRA.
Id.
114. Battles v. Anne Arundel County Bd. of Educ., 904 F. Supp. 471, 476 (D. Md. 1995)
("Rather than view RFRA as overturning the Supreme Court's interpretation of the First
Amendment, it is proper to view the Act as creating a separate statutory 'claim or defense to persons
whose religious exercise is substantially burdened by the government. . . .'") (citing American Life
League, Inc. v. Reno, 47 F.3d 642 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 55 (1995)). When the
religious claimant does not challenge the constitutionality of RFRA, courts are hesitant to address
the issue. In such a case, courts seem to prefer to assume the constitutionality of the Act for the
purposes of deciding the case before it. Abdul-Akbar v. Department of Corrections, 910 F. Supp.
986, 1007 (D. Del. 1995) ("However, the court will assume the constitutionality of the RFRA for
the sake of this decision."). See also Sasnett, 891 F. Supp. at 1305; Belgard, 883 F. Supp. at 510;
Miller, 538 N.W.2d at 573; Douglas Laycock, The Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 1993 BYU
L. REv. 221.
115. Fliegel, supra note 42, at 100 ("[T]here is no question but that RFRA will lead to
increased protection for religious liberty."). See supranote 80 for an elaboration on the exemptions
to the Smith analysis which would precipitate a compelling interest analysis. The exceptions which
Smith provides do not provide for significant application of the compelling interest test. Fliegel,
supra note 42, at 57. One commentator states that due to the low number of decisions which have
invalidated laws under the hybrid exception (the author stated no cases had done so, but since that
article, at least Smith v. FairEmployment & Housing Commission, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 395 (Cal. 1994),
was decided in the religious claimant's favor, based on the hybrid exception), the practical
significance of protecting more religious claimants under the compelling interest test is reduced.
Fiegel, supra note 42, at 57. Further, the individualized exemption of the unemployment
compensation exception has not been successfully applied to other contexts, limiting the practical
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especially clear.1 1 6 RFRA is not expected to provide guidance for consistent
decisions nor produce any other theory or test that the courts were not already
utilizing prior to the Smith decision. " 7 As cases involving RFRA-based claims
are beginning to be heard by courts across the country, it seems that RFRA is
provoking courts to analyze the issues surrounding the compelling interest test
with more particularity than before Smith," 8 though it is possible that courts
may additionally factor congressional motivation behind RFRA into the
compelling interest analysis.
As a result of the Supreme Court's decision in Smith, a religious adherent
seeking a free exercise exemption from a burdensome law would not likely be
successful under the federal Free Exercise Clause." 9 One way in which the
negative effect of Smith has been lessened is that states have begun to maintain
the protections of the pre-Smith Free Exercise Clause in their own state
constitutions. 20 As an additional compensation for Smith's effects, RFRA acts
as a statutory reinstatement of the protection that the Court interpreted the Free
Exercise Clause to provide before Smith. Both methods of supplementing the
current interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause are important in their relation
to marital status discrimination in housing.
III.

EFFECT OF SMITH AND RFRA ON MARITAL STATUS DISCRIMINATION

While it is RFRA which is currently creating controversy in the area of
unmarried couples' searches for housing, it is important to address the events
leading up to the passage of RFRA to interpret how RFRA will likely hinder
unmarried couples' access to housing. Initially, the Court's decision in Smith
affected the way the state courts interpreted their state free exercise clauses.
Then, Smith prompted Congress to enact RFRA, which strengthens the
protection of the right to the free exercise of religion. This in turn appears to
strengthen the landlords' arguments that their exercise of religion will prevail
against laws prohibiting marital status discrimination in housing.

significance of that exemption as well. Id. at 79.
116. See Markey, supra note 10, at 738-39. C. Fliegel, supranote 42, at 90-91 (arguing that
claims under RFRA will provide a claimant with certainty by allowing him to avoid the Supreme
Court's continuing struggle over defining the Free Exercise Clause).
117. See supra note 104 for an explanation of why some consider RFRA to be little
improvement.
118. See Melissa Fishman Cordish, Comment, A Proposalfor the Reconciliation of Free
Exercise Rights and Anti-DiscriminationLaw, 43 UCLA L. REv. 2113, 2124 (1996).
119. See infra notes 121-29 and accompanying text.
120. See infra notes 133-37 and accompanying text.
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A. Smith's Effect on MaritalStatus Discrimination
The Supreme Court's decision in Employment Division v. Smith'2 1 allowed
the government more latitude under the Free Exercise Clause to enforce laws
which burden one's free exercise of religion."n All that Smith requires for
such a burden to be constitutional is that the law be neutral and generally
applicable.' 21 Laws precluding marital status discrimination in housing are
neutral because they are not aimed at impairing the exercise of any particular
religion, facially or in their application." 4 Additionally, these laws are
generally applicable because they apply equally to all citizens who engage in the
sale and rental of property and are not only applicable to a specific religious
group;'2s nor are they underinclusive. "6
Since laws which prohibit
discrimination based on marital status in housing are neutral and generally
applicable, they are constitutional according to Smith, regardless of the burden
upon the exercise of religion. 27 Thus, landlords' claims that a marital status

121. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
122. FLOWERS, supra note 29, at 130. See supra notes 44-46, 76-77, 81-84 and accompanying
text for an explanation of the stringency of the compelling interest test as compared to that of the
incidental effects test. See also Musial, supra note 54, at 18. The philosophies of the justices
presently sitting on the Supreme Court indicate that the rationale of the Smith decision is not likely
to be altered: the Smith case was decided by a 5-4 majority, of which all three of the dissenters and
Justice White, who joined the majority, have left the Court. Lee, supra note 109, at 89-90.
Justices Marshall and Brennan have been replaced by Justice Thomas, who agrees with the Smith
decision and Souter, who sides with the Smith dissenters, respectively. Id. This results in a 5-2
Court, favoring the Smith majority's decision. Id. Justices Ginsburg and Breyer have also joined
the Court after the Smith case was decided. Their views of Smith are unclear.
123. Smith, 494 U.S. at 886. See supranotes 66-75 and accompanying text for an explanation
of "neutral" and "generally applicable." This test replaced the stricter compelling interest test from
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963).
124. The Alaska Supreme Court used this formulation of "neutrality" and reached the same
conclusion in Swanner v. Anchorage Equal Rights Commission, 874 P.2d 274, 279-80 (Alaska
1994), discussing Anchorage's municipal anti-discrimination code, ANCHORAGE, ALASKA, CODE §
5.20.020 and Alaska's anti-discrimination statute, ALASKA STAT. § 18.80.240. See also Smith v.
Fair Employment & Hous. Comm'n, 913 P.2d 909, 919 (Cal. 1996).
125. This is the Alaska Supreme Court's formulation of "general applicability," as well as the
conclusion the court reached, as expressed in Swanner, 874 P.2d at 280 (discussing Anchorage
municipal anti-discrimination code, ANCHORAGE, ALASKA, CODE § 5.20.020 and Alaska's antidiscrimination statute, ALASKA STAT. § 18.80.240). See also Smith v. Fair Employment & Hous.
Comm'n, 913 P.2d 909, 919 (Cal. 1996).
126. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
127. FLOWERS, supra note 29, at 130. See Smith, 913 P.2d at 919. In Employment Division
v. Smith, the Court at least implicitly indicated that the Free Exercise Clause tolerates any amount
of burden upon a religious adherent, as long as the governmental action imposing the burden is
neutral and generally applicable. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 885 (1990) ("Mhe
sounder approach ...is to hold ...[that] [t]he
government's ability to enforce generally applicable
prohibitions of socially harmful conduct . . . 'cannot depend on measuring the effects of a
governmental action on a religious objector's spiritual development'") (quoting Lyng v. Northwest
Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 451 (1988)). The Smith Court also stated "that
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discrimination provision violates their exercise of religion under the Free
Exercise Clause of the United States Constitution would fail. 2 ' As a result,
landlords who choose to base their free exercise defenses solely on the federal
Constitution would be required to comply with the anti-discrimination
statute.' 29 With such a prognosis, it is unlikely for a landlord to base his or
her defense solely on the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment.
If Smith's effect upon the Free Exercise Clause were the current status of
free exercise jurisprudence, tenants in every state which recognizes a cause of
action for marital status discrimination in housing would win their discrimination
claims.' 30 However, this is not how the law currently stands. The Smith

the right of free exercise does not relieve an individual of the obligation to comply with a 'valid and
neutral law of general applicability on the ground that the law proscribes (or prescribes) conduct that
his religion prescribes (or proscribes).'" Id. at 879 (quoting United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252,
263 n.3 (1982)). See also Fliegel, supra note 42, at 72 (stating that the analysis under the Free
Exercise Clause ends if the law is neutral and generally applicable, even if there is a cognizable
burden upon free exercise).
128. Smith, 913 P.2d at 918 ("The First Amendment does not support [the landlord's] claim.").
Swanner, 874 P.2d at 280 ("We conclude that enforcing [the statute and ordinance prohibiting
marital status discrimination] against Swanner does not violate his right to free exercise of religion
under the United States Constitution."); Cooper v. French, 460 N.W.2d 2, 8, 9 (Minn. 1990)
(concluding that because the state constitution provides a broader protection of religion than does
the federal Constitution, the court will only consider the landlord's arguments under the state
constitution even though the landlord also raised the issue under the federal Constitution); Attorney
Gen. v. Desilets, 636 N.E.2d 233, 235-36 (Mass. 1994) (same). See Fliegel, supra note 42, at 94
(stating that, in general, claimants seeking religious exemptions "face the prospect of marginal
success under the [Free Exercise Clause of the] Constitution ... .
129. See Fliegel, supra note 42, at 94.
130. A tenant would not be able to bring a cause of action in a state which does not have a
provision prohibiting marital status discrimination in housing. Twenty-one states and the District
of Columbia have statutes prohibiting housing discrimination based on marital status: ALASKA STAT.
§ 18.80.240 (1994); CAL. Gov'T CODE § 12955 (West 1992 & Supp. 1997); COLO. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 24-34-502(l)(a) (West 1990 & Supp. 1996); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46a-64c (West
1995); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 4603 (1993); D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-2515 (1981 & Supp. 1996);
HAW. REV. STAT. § 515-3 (Supp. 1992); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 775,
5/1-103(J), (Q), 5/3-102
(Smith-Hurd 1993 & Supp. 1996); MD. ANN. CODE art. 49B, § 22 (Supp. 1994); MASS. GEN.
LAWS ANN. ch 151B, § 4(6)-(7) (West Supp. 1995); MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 37.2502 (Supp..
1995); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 363.03(2) (West Supp. 1995); MONT. CODE ANN. § 49-2-305 (1995);
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 354-A: 10 (1995); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10: 5-12(g)-(h) (West 1993 &
Supp. 1996); N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 296(5) (McKinney 1993 & Supp. 1996); N.D. CENT. CODE § 1402.4-12 (Supp. 1995) ("status with respect to marriage"); OR. REV. STAT. § 659.033 (1995); R.I.
GEN. LAWS § 34-37-4 (1995); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 4503 (Supp. 1991); WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 49.60.222 (West Supp. 1995); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 101.22 (West Supp. 1995). Two states
give their political subdivisions the authority to prohibit marital staus discrimination in housing, but
do not directly prohibit it. NEB. REV. STAT. §18-1724 (1991); VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-37.3:8
(Michie 1989).
Minnesota's statute is a fairly typical example of these statutes. It is very similar to the federal
Fair Housing Act. It states in relevant part:
It is an unfair discriminatory practice:
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(1) For an owner, lessee, sublessee, assignee, or managing agent of, or other person.
having the right to sell, rent or lease any real property, or any agent of any of these:
(a) to refuse to sell, rent, or lease or otherwise deny to or withhold from any person or
group of persons any real property because of. . .marital status ....
(b) to discriminate against any person or group of persons because of ..marital status
...in the terms, conditions or privileges of the sale, rental or lease of any real property
or in the furnishing of facilities or services in connection therewith ....
(c) in any transaction involving real property, to print, circulate or post . . . any
advertisement or sign, or . . . make any record or inquiry in connection with the
prospective purchase, rental, or lease of real property which expresses, directly or
indirectly, any limitation, specification, or discrimination as to . . .marital status
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 363.03(2)(1)(a)-(c) (West 1996).
Additionally, some municipalities have provisions which prohibit discrimination based on
marital status. See, e.g., ANCHORAGE, ALASKA, CODE § 5.20.020; CHICAGO, ILL., ORDINANCE
§ 5-8-030. Chicago's ordinance is similar to the state statutes. It provides in relevant part:
It shall be an unfair housing practice and unlawful for any owner... managing agent,
or any other person . . . having the right to sell, rent, lease or sublease any housing
accommodation . . . [t]o refuse to sell, lease or rent, any real estate for residential
purposes within the city of Chicago because of the . . . marital status . . . of the
proposed buyer or renter.
Id.
Petitioners in Alaska, California, Massachusetts, and Minnesota have raised the issue of
whether provisions prohibiting discrimination in housing on the basis of marital status are
outweighed by landlords' claims that these provisions infringed upon their free exercise of religion.
The supreme courts of California and Alaska have conclusively answered the question, holding that
the landlord's free exercise claim did not trump the anti-discrimination provisions. Swanner v.
Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n, 874 P.2d 274, 285 (Alaska 1994) (holding that the protection of
unmarried couples' access to housing was a compelling interest); Smith v. Fair Employment &
Hous. Comm'n, 913 P.2d 909, 928-32 (Cal. 1996) (holding thata law which forbad landlords from
discriminating against unmarried couples did not substantially burden their free exercise of religion).
The Massachusetts Supreme Court, however, has held that the state may have a compelling interest
in preventing marital status discrimination-trumping the landlord's free exercise claim-if the
unmarried couple could show that they would in fact have difficulty finding housing because of their
marital status. Attorney Gen. v. Desilets, 636 N.E.2d 233, 240 (Mass. 1994). The court remanded
the case for a factual determination on this issue. Id. at 241, 243. However, the lower court never
retried the case.
Concerning the narrower but still crucial issue of whether the term "marital status" in statutes
includes and thus protects unmarried cohabitants, the Wisconsin Supreme Court has held that it did
not because it was the couple's "conduct" which the landlords objected to, not their "status," which
the court held was all that the statute protected. County of Dane v. Norman, 497 N.W.2d 714 (Wis.
1993) (involving the "marital status" definitional issue but not the issue of a landlord's free exercise
claim). The court in Cooper v. French, 460 N.W.2d 2 (Minn. 1990), similarly found that "marital
status" did not protect unmarried couples due to Minnesota's public policy against fornication and
favoring marriage, and in light of similar statutes which did not protect unmarried couples, thus
finding in favor of the landlord. Id. at 6-7. In Mister v. A.R.K. Partnership,553 N.E.2d 1152,
1159-60 (Il. App. Ct. 1990), the Illinois Appellate Court also held that Illinois' "marital status"
provision does not protect unmarried cohabitants.
In Alaska, California and Massachusetts, however, this particular argument has been raised
by landlords and rejected. These courts have held that "marital status" does include unmarried
cohabitants. See Swanner v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n, 874 P.2d 274, 278 (Alaska 1994);
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decision triggered two events which affect the success of a tenant who brings a
marital status discrimination claim. The first of these is that state courts began
to rely on their own state constitutions to protect the free exercise of religion to
a level greater than that of the First Amendment.'
The second event is the
32
passage of RFRA.
The state courts responded to Smith by looking to the free exercise clauses
in their state constitutions to protect landlords' free exercise of religion when
tenants brought claims against discriminatory landlords. 133 Before Smith, state
courts generally interpreted their state free exercise provisions to afford the same
protection as the Free Exercise Clause of the U.S. Constitution in all types of

Donahue v. Fair Employment & Hous. Comm'n, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 32, 38 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991);
Smith v. Fair Employment & Hous. Comm'n, 913 P.2d 909, 915-18 (Cal. 1996); Attorney Gen.
v. Desilets, 636 N.E.2d 233, 235 (Mass. 1994). Once these courts have resolved the definition of
"marital status," they proceeded to consider the landlords' free exercise claim.
While a California state assembly member proposed legislation to essentially remove "marital
status" as a protected class under California fair housing law after the California Supreme Court
decided Smith, the legislation did not pass. Cordish, supra note 118, at 2115.
131. See infra notes 133-37 and accompanying text.
132. See infra notes 138-48 and accompanying text.
133. Parsell, supra note 36, at 747 (speaking of the fact that, in general-not only with regard
to marital status discrimination free exercise situations-states began to look to their own
constitutions for alternate protection for free exercise after Smith). For example, the Minnesota
Supreme Court stated that "[i]n light of the unforeseeable changes in established first amendment
law set forth in recent decisions of the United States Supreme Court, justice demands that we
analyze the present case in light of the protections found in the Minnesota Constitution." Cooper,
460 N.W.2d at 8. A state court is only able to so hold if a landlord has alleged that his or her rights
to free exercise of religion are infringed under his or her state constitution's free exercise clause.
In all, six states' courts have so far explicitly maintained the compelling interest test. See Swanner
v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n, 874 P.2d 274, 280-81 (Alaska 1994); Donahue v. Fair
Employment & Hous. Comm'n, 2 Cal. Rptr. 32 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991). Some courts have announced
this differing standard in cases other than those dealing with marital status discrimination. See
Rupert v. City of Portland, 605 A.2d 63 (Me. 1992); Society of Jesus v. Boston Landmarks
Comm'n, 564 N.E.2d 571 (Mass. 1990); State v. Hershberger, 462 N.W.2d 393 (Minn. 1990); First
Covenant Church v. Seattle, 840 P.2d 174 (Wash. 1992). See also Parsell, supra note 36, at 756
& n.51.
Such responses by the state courts are constitutional because state constitutions can supplement
the rights granted in the federal constitution by protecting their citizens to a greater extent than that
of the federal constitution. See Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 81 (1980)
("Our reasoning in Lloyd, however, does not . . . limit the authority of the State to exercise its
police power or its sovereign right to adopt in its own Constitution individual liberties more
expansive than those conferred by the Federal Constitution."). If the highest state court's decision
relies independently on the stronger protections of the state constitution, then the federal courts
cannot even reconsider the court's decision because of the adequate and independent state ground
doctrine. See, e.g., Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1041 (1983); Parsell, supra note 36, at 754.
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cases . " After Smith changed the standard to the incidental effects test,
however, some state courts ceased mirroring the Supreme Court's jurisprudence
and instead continued to analyze free exercise claims brought under their state
constitution under the compelling interest standard. 35 In states which have
already reaffirmed their use of the compelling interest test for their state
constitutions' free exercise clauses, and in those which will do so in the future,
the tenant who brings a marital status discrimination claim will probably lose.
The tenant will lose because, contrary to the position of this Note, state courts
are finding that tenants' claims fail to survive strict scrutiny. However, there
are two states which use the compelling interest test where a tenant could, in
fact, prevail. A tenant may prevail if he or she brought the cause of action in
either Alaska or California, because those states' supreme courts have held that
unmarried cohabitants' interests amounted to a compelling interest and did not
constitute a substantial burden, respectively."' 6 These two states are the
exception to the rule. Additionally, the tenant may prevail in Oregon and
Vermont because the state courts have adopted the "incidental effects" rationale
of Smith.'37
B. RFRA's Effect on Marital Status Discrimination
RFRA's importance to the subject of marital status discrimination is that it
provides a new weapon for landlords in their attempts to keep unmarried couples

134. Parsell, supra note 36, at 756. Thus, challenges to both state and federal free exercise
clauses were analyzed under the compelling interest test. Sometimes the state courts did not find
it necessary to resort to the protections of their state constitutions when claimants based their
arguments on both the Free Exercise Clause of the U.S. Constitution and the state constitution's free
exercise clause, since the state's clause would be essentially duplicative. Id. In these cases, the
courts rested their decisions on the federal clause alone, without considering the reach of the state
clause, even though the state clause would have provided the equivalent protection. Id. Thus, when
some state courts seek to break away from the Supreme Court's interpretation of free exercise
protection, a dearth of case law interpreting the state constitution is often encountered. Angela C.
Carmella, State Constitutional Protection of Religious Exercise: An Emerging Post-Smith
Jurisprudence, 1993 BYU L. REV. 275, 298-99.
135. Parsell, supra note 36, at 755 n.51; Renee Skinner, The Church of the Lukumi Babalu
Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah: Still Sacrificing Free Exercise, 46 BAYLOR L. REV. 259, 261-62
(1994) (stating that in addition to turning to state free exercise clauses, state courts have determined
that laws are neither neutral nor generally applicable so as to escape the application of Employment
Division v. Smith).
136. See supra note 130.
137. Carmella, supra note 134, at 307-09; Tracey Levy, Rediscovering Rights: State Courts
Reconsider the Free Exercise Clause of Their Own Constitutions in the Wake of Employment
Division v. Smith, 67 TEMP. L. REV. 1017, 1035-37, 1047-49 (1994) (evaluating the approaches
of Oregon and Vermont and concluding that their constitutions provide no greater protection than
the First Amendment). Both Oregon and Vermont have provisions prohibiting marital status
discrimination, though Oregon has defined "marital status" to not include unmarried cohabitants.
See supra notes 21, 130.
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out of their apartments. 38 RFRA effectively creates a statutory "Free
Exercise Clause" which is as rigorous as the Free Exercise Clause was prior to
the Supreme Court's decision in Smith. 39 Thus, the passage of RFRA makes
landlords' claims more likely to prevail." 4 Landlords now have a statutory
means by which to require the government to advance a compelling interest
before their defenses can be defeated. "'
As a result of the state courts' and Congress' attempts to fortify the free
exercise protection which the Smith decision weakened, the legal bases for
landlords' free exercise defenses have essentially tripled." 2 Now landlords
may base their defenses upon the Free Exercise Clause, an individual state's free
exercise clause"13 or RFRA.'1
As explained previously, landlords are

138. In states whose courts have interpreted their constitutions' free exercise clauses as
providing greater protection than the Free Exercise Clause, RFRA is not truly necessary, though a
welcome reinforcement. However, if a state court chooses (or has already chosen) to grant
protection under its free exercise clause comparable to that of the Free Exercise Clause, then RFRA
would be vital to the success of that landlord's defense to a marital status discrimination claim.
139. Markey, supra note 10, at 738.
140. See Smith v. Fair Employment & Hous. Comm'n, 913 P.2d 909 (Cal. 1996). The
California Supreme Court noted that under the holding of Enployment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S.
872 (1990), the landlord's claim would not succeed. Smith, 913 P.2d at 920. However, the
landlord argued that under the "hybrid" exception of Employment Division v. Smith, the
government's law may be subject to the more stringent compelling interest test. Id. See supra note
79; infra note 260. However, the court decided that it did not have to address the "hybrid" issue
because RFRA required the compelling interest test anyway. Smith, 913 P.2d at 921. See also
Swanner v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n, 874 P.2d 274 (Alaska 1994). The Alaska Supreme
Court explained that RFRA's change of free exercise analysis under the First Amendment to the
compelling interest test resulted in a higher burden on the part of the state (and the tenant). Id. at
280 n.9. Ultimately, however, the heightened burden required by RFRA was not outcomedeterminative because the court found that the state had a compelling interest. Id. Even though the
tenant won in the Swanner case, this outcome is an anomaly because the Swanner court is the only
one to have found a compelling interest in protecting unmarried couples' access to housing. The
fact that RFRA triggers analysis under the compelling interest test indicates that, overall, the Act
makes the landlords' defenses more likely to prevail.
141. See supra note 98 and accompanying text (explaining that RFRA statutorily mandates the
use of the compelling interest'test).
142. These bases are listed separately for purposes of discussion. A landlord may, however,
choose to use two or even all three of them together, instead of just one. See, e.g., Swanner, 874
P.2d at 276 (landlord claimed his right to free exercise of religion was violated under both the
United States and Alaska Constitutions).
143. State free exercise clauses have not, of course, just recently been written. Now, however,
landlords are looking to the state clauses to find more protection for religion after Employment
Division v. Smith weakened the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, and state courts are
providing such protection. See generally Parsell, supra note 36, at 754-58.
144. Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488 (codified at42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to bb-4 (1994)).
See supra notes 98, 138-41 and accompanying text.
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unlikely to base their defenses on the Free Exercise Clause. 45 However,
landlords are still left with two viable options: their state's free exercise clause
or RFRA. For landlords to have a chance of success by basing their defenses
on the state's free exercise clause, the test which is used for the state's free
exercise clause must be equivalent to the compelling interest test.'4 If this is
the case, then landlords could choose to proceed under their state constitutional
provision. 141 In such a situation, the state's free exercise clause may be
sufficient for the landlord to succeed in her argument that a marital status
discrimination in housing provision is a burden on her freedom of religion. 4
However, for landlords to increase the likelihood of succeeding on their free
exercise defenses, they would probably proceed under RFRA as well. In the
event that the landlords' state has not maintained a standard as exacting as the
compelling interest test for the state free exercise clause, the basis for the
landlords' free exercise defenses would be RFRA alone.
Whether the landlords' defenses are based on their state's free exercise
clause or RFRA, prospective tenants are faced with an uphill battle in order to
prevail. State courts addressing this issue have been finding that under either,
tenants must satisfy strict scrutiny to keep a free exercise exemption from
defeating the purpose of the anti-discrimination law. 49 Currently, only in the
state of Alaska, and theoretically in Massachusetts, is this possible."5 Except
for California, the other state court which has considered this issue, Minnesota,
has implicitly held that the state's interest in prohibiting marital status

145. See Eugene Gressman & Angela C. Carmella, The RFRA Revision of the Free Exercise
Clause, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 65, 105 (1996) ("Instead of bringing a constitutional action under the Free
Exercise Clause, one should bring a claim under RFRA."). See supra notes 121-29 and
accompanying text.
146. If the state does not utilize the compelling interest test, then the state government may
permit a lesser showing to justify a burden on the free exercise of religion. In such a situation, the
landlord may lose. See supra text accompanying note 135. Additionally, there must be a provision
prohibiting marital status discrimination in housing. Without such a provision a landlord would have
no need to raise the free exercise defense in the first place.
147. Parsell, supra note 36, at 755. In fact, one scholar has suggested that an attorney's failure
to base a free exercise claim on a state's free exercise clause would amount to malpractice. See
Laycock, supra note 86, at 854.
148. Parsell, supra note 36, at 757 (stating that state courts focus on the free exercise protection
which the states' constitutional provisions provide because analysis under the First Amendment
affords no greater protection of religion).
149. See Swanner v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n, 874 P.2d 274, 280-81 & n.9 (Alaska
1994); Attorney Gen. v. Desilets, 636 N.E.2d 233, 236 & n.5 (Mass. 1994).
150. See Swanner, 874 P.2d at 274. See also Desilets, 636 N.E.2d at 233 and supranote 130
for an explanation of why this is only theoretically possible in Massachusetts.
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Furthermore, there are

eighteen states which have provisions prohibiting marital status discrimination
in housing whose courts have not addressed the potentially conflicting rights of
landlords. The status of unmarried couples' rights to housing remains wholly
undetermined in these states. The few and varying state court decisions which
have addressed this issue have failed to solve on a nationwide scale the growing
conflict between unmarried couples' right to access housing and landlords' rights
to the free exercise of their religion.
IV.

WHY RFRA SHOULD NOT PROVIDE A DEFENSE
TO MARITAL STATUS DISCRIMINATION

While the passage of RFRA poses a new hurdle for opponents of marital
status discrimination in housing,' 52 it is not insurmountable. Tenants have two
possible methods to prevail over landlords' use of RFRA as a defense to the
tenants' marital status discrimination claims. The first method is to claim that
laws which require landlords to rent to unmarried couples do not impose a
substantial burden on the landlords' exercise of religion. As with the Supreme
Court's pre-Smith Free Exercise Clause jurisprudence, there is no need to
proceed to the further analysis required by RFRA if there is no substantial
burden.'53 If there is no substantial burden, RFRA is not implicated."M
The second method to prevent landlords from succeeding in using RFRA
as a statutory defense to marital status discrimination claims is to establish that
such laws satisfy RFRA's strict scrutiny analysis. Under this method, RFRA
permits a substantial burden to be placed on persons' free exercise of religion
if the governmental entity can advance a compelling interest to justify the burden
Contrary to
and use the least restrictive means to achieve that interest.15
some lower courts' decisions, 56 prohibiting landlords from discriminating on

151. Cooper v. French, 460 N.W.2d 2, 9-11 (Minn. 1990) (holding that the state's marital
discrimination statute did not protect unmarried couples while also concluding that the substantial
burden on the landlord was not supported by a compelling governmental interest). This dicta is
indicative of how that court may rule in future cases if the legislature changes the marital
discrimination statute to include unmarried cohabitants. See supra note 130.
The California Supreme Court has held that tenants do not need to satisfy strict scrutiny
because landlords' free exercise rights are not substantially burdened. Smith v. Fair Employment
& Hous. Comm'n, 913 P.2d 909 (Cal. 1996).
152. See supra notes 138-41 and accompanying text.
153. American Life League, Inc. v. Reno, 47 F.3d 642, 654 (4th Cir. 1995). See also Fliegel,
supra note 42, at 65 (stating that "the substantial burden requirement thus represents a fundamental
threshold inquiry: absent the requisite burden, no further analysis is necessary").
154. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-l(b) (1994) (conditioning the application of the entire subsection on
the existence of a "substantial burden"). See supra note 98 for the relevant text of RFRA.
155. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-l(b) (1994). See supra note 98 for the relevant text of RFRA.
156. See supra note 130 (listing the cases which have so held).
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the basis of marital status is not a substantial burden on the exercise of their
However, if the Supreme Court finds that marital status
religion.'57
discrimination in housing laws are a substantial burden on the exercise of
religion, laws prohibiting such discrimination are still valid because ensuring
these prospective tenants' access to housing is a compelling government

interest. 158
A. When RFRA is Not Implicated
1. What Constitutes a Substantial Burden
"Substantial burden" denotes that there is a legally cognizable degree of
The actual degree of conflict is
conflict between law and religion." 9
important because RFRA is only implicated when "[g]overnment . .
substantially burden[s] a person's exercise of religion . ...' Since RFRA
does not indicate that the Court's analysis of substantial burden was inadequate
to protect free exercise interests, it is proper to consider all of the Supreme
Court's pre-Smith formulations of "substantial burden" in the analysis under
RFRA.aI However, this definition of "substantial burden" provides little
guidance if it is not viewed in the context of practical situations.162 The
Supreme Court has to some extent defined "substantial burden" in relation to the
religious activity which is claimed to be burdened. 163 For example, the burden

157. See infra notes 192-228 and accompanying text. To date, only one court has held such
a prohibition to not constitute a substantial burden. See Smith v. Fair Employment & Hous.
Comm'n, 913 P.2d 909, 929 (Cal. 1996).
158. See infra notes 233-85 and accompanying text. To date, only one court has held this
interest to be compelling. Swanner v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n, 874 P.2d 274, 283 (Alaska
1994).
159. See Fliegel, supra note 42, at 65. This definition itself provides little guidance when
applying it to a new fact situation. The definition is only useful in light of the cases in which the
Supreme Court has determined what is and is not a "legally cognizable degree of conflict." See
supra note 57.
160. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-l(a) (1994). In other words, RFRA is not triggered when the burden
is less than "substantial."
161. Goodall v. Stafford County Sch. Bd., 60 F.3d 168, 171 (4th Cir. 1995) ("Since RFRA
does not purport to create a new substantial burden test, we may look to pre-RFRA cases in order
to assess the burden on the plaintiffs for their RFRA claim."). Smith, 913 P.2d at 924 (noting that
the legislative history of RFRA indicates that courts look to pre-Employment Division v. Smith
jurisprudence forguidance in determining "substantial burden"). See also 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b)(1)
(1994) (explaining that Congress' motivation in passing RFRA was to reinstate the compelling
interest test, and not stating any intent to alter the substantial burden analysis).
162. Smith, 913 P.2d at 924.
163. See Thomas v. Review Bd. of the Ind. Employment See. Div., 450 U.S. 707 (1981). In
Thomas, the burden on the claimant was the denial of unemployment compensation. Id. at 709. The
Court considered a "substantial burden" to be "[w]here the state conditions receipt of an important
benefit upon conduct proscribed by a religious faith, or where it denies such a benefit because of
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on the religious activity in Thomas v. Review Board" was the denial of
unemployment benefits. Thus, the Thomas Court defined substantial burden as
one where "the state conditions receipt of an important benefit upon conduct
proscribed by a religious faith . . . thereby putting substantial pressure on an
adherent to modify his [or her] behavior
. 165 The application of such a
definition of substantial burden to other fact patterns is thus made more difficult
because there is not one explicit definition of "substantial burden." In spite of
the differences between the varying definitions, three of the Court's formulations
of "substantial burden" are useful in analyzing the extent of the burden imposed
upon landlords by prohibitions of marital status discrimination. In the first
instance, the Court did not find a "substantial burden" unless the government
coerces religious adherents into violating their beliefs." Secondly, the Court
found that a substantial burden exists when the government forces a religious
adherent to choose between abandoning the precepts of the religion or foregoing
governmental benefits. 67 In the final instance, the Court did not find a
substantial burden when the practice of religion was made more expensive."
For the sake of clarity, these three formulations of what the Supreme Court has
determined to be "substantial" will be explained prior to presenting the
arguments against a finding of substantial burden.' 69 In light of these
formulations, it is argued that free exercise jurisprudence does not deem
prohibiting marital status discrimination to be a substantial burden on landlords'
free exercise of religion.
The Supreme Court issued its most recent formulation of "substantial
burden" in Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n. 7° In Lyng,

conduct mandated by religious belief. . . " Id. at 717-18. Thus, the phrasing of what constituted
a "substantial burden" was to some extent tailored to the actual burden at issue in the case. The
Supreme Court's analysis of the "substantial burden" component of the free exercise analysis has
developed gradually through time, until the analysis' "full flowering" in Lyng v. Northwest Indian
Cemetery ProtectiveAss'n, 485 U.S. 439 (1988). Markey, supra note 10, at 721 n.ll1.
164. 450 U.S. 707 (1981).
165. Id. at 717-18.
166. See infra notes 170-75 and accompanying text.
167. See infra notes 176-79 and accompanying text.
168. See infra notes 180-91 and accompanying text.
169. See infra notes 192-228 and accompanying text.
170. 485 U.S. 439 (1988). In Lyng, the Forest Service decided to build a road through a
national forest, which was adjacent to a Native American Indian reservation, in order to connect two
towns. Id. at 442. The Native Americans had historically used the part of the national forest where
the road was to be built for their spiritual activities. Id. In fact, a commissioned study found that
the area was an "indispensable part of Indian religious conceptualization and practice." Id. Not
only was the particular plot of land important to the Native Americans' religion, but the condition
of the land as it existed at that time was important as well. Id. at 451. The study indicated that
"'successful use of the [area] is dependent upon and facilitated by certain qualities of the physical
environment, the most important of which are privacy, silence, and an undisturbed natural setting.'"
Id. at 442. The Forest Service did not rely too heavily upon the study's determinations and
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the Court rejected the Native American petitioners' claims that building a road
through their religious sites violated their free exercise of religion. 7' The
Lyng Court held that a burden on religion can be considered "substantial" only
if the governmental action coerced religious adherents into violating their
The Court further stated that the incidental effects of a
beliefs."
governmental action which made the religion more difficult to practice was not
a burden sufficient to require the government to show a compelling
justification."7 The Lyng Court concluded that the Native Americans' claims
did not meet this definition of substantial burden, 74 even though the Court
recognized that the building of the road would have "devastating effects" on the
practice of their religion."7 '
In the second example of what constitutes a "substantial burden" on the free
exercise of religion, the Supreme Court found in Sherbert v. Verner 76 that a
burden exists when the government forces a religious adherent to choose
between abandoning the precepts of the religion or foregoing governmental
benefits. 77 The choice that the petitioner in Sherbert was faced with was
observing her religion which forbade work on her Sabbath and losing
unemployment benefits because she was discharged without "good cause" or
ignoring her beliefs and therefore be eligible for the benefits." The Sherbert

proceeded with the planning of the road. Id. at 443. The Forest Service did, however, try to select
a route for the road which was as far removed as possible from the sites used by the Native
Americans for their spiritual activities and which avoided archeological sites. Id. The Native
Americans then brought suit seeking to prevent the building of the road, arguing that the road would
interfere with the free exercise of their religion. Id.
171. Id. at 452.
172. Id. at 449. An important factor to the Lyng Court seemed to be that the building of the
road in question was an exercise of the government's legitimate conduct of its own internal affairs.
Id. at 451-52. The Court included in this category of "internal affairs" social welfare programs,
foreign aid and conservation projects. Id. at 452. Thus, it is difficult to say whether the federal
government's programs geared toward prohibiting discrimination would be considered "internal
affairs" under the Lyng Court's definition. If they were not, the outcome may be different than that
in Lyng.
173. Id. at 450-51. The Lyng Court did not phrase its holding explicitly in terms of a
.substantial burden" or a "compelling interest"; rather, the Court stated that the government was
not required to bring forth a compelling justification:
This does not and cannot imply that incidental effects of government programs, which
may make it more difficult to practice certain religions but which have no tendency to
coerce individuals into acting contrary to their religious beliefs, require government to
bring forward a compelling justification for its otherwise lawful actions.
Id.
174. Id. at 447, 452.
175. Id. at 451.
176. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
177. Id. at 404 (citing Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 607 (1961)) (involving the denial
of unemployment benefits because of the plaintiffs refusal to work due to religious reasons).
178. Id. at 400-01.
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Court held that this indirect financial pressure was enough to constitute a
substantial burden. 79
The Supreme Court's decision in Braunfeld v. Brown"tu is the third
example of the Supreme Court's analysis of "substantial" burden. The issue in
Braunfeldwas whether the state's recently-passed Sunday closing laws interfered
with the exercise of the appellants' religion.' 8 ' The appellants were retail
business owners whose religion required them to observe their Sabbath on
Saturday and, therefore, not operate their business on that day."
To be
competitive with other merchants, appellants had been in the practice of selling
their goods on Sundays, which did not raise any objections until the passage of
the state's Sunday closing law.' 83 The choice which the appellants then faced
was giving up the tenet of Sabbath observance or being placed at an economic
disadvantage as compared to merchants who did not hold the same religious
beliefs."
Ultimately, the Braunfeld Court held that the burden on the
appellants was not substantial because the government law did not make any
religious practice illegal, but only made the practice of appellants' religion more
expensive. a
The Supreme Court's decision in Braunfeld was to a great extent due to the
Court's distinction between " direct" and " indirect" burdens."s The Braunfeld
Court reasoned that since the burden on the business owners was indirect it was
therefore not substantial. "S This distinction has since been eliminated by the
Supreme Court's decision in Sherbert v. Verner. 'u However, Sherbert did not
explicitly overrule Braunfeld.89 Even though making the practice of religion

179. Id. at 401-02.
180. 366 U.S. 599 (1961).
181. Id. at 601-02.
182. Id.at 601.
183. Id.
184. Id.at 601-02.
185. Id. at 605.
186. Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 607 (1961) ("[If the State regulates conduct by
enacting a general law within its power . . . the statute is valid despite its indirect burden on
religious observance. . . . "). A direct burden is making some religious practice illegal, while an
indirect burden is one which only impedes the observance of religion. Id. at 606-07.
187. Id.
188. 374 U.S. 398, 403-04 (1963)
In a sense the consequences of such a disqualification to religious principles and
practices may be only an indirect result of welfare legislation ... [but g]overnmental
imposition of such a choice puts the same kind of burden upon the free exercise of
religion as would a fine imposed against appellant for her Saturday worship.
Id. See also Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 718 (1981).
189. Grosz v. City of Miami Beach, Florida, 721 F.2d 729, 737 (11th Cir. 1983) ("Sherbert
specifically avoids overruling Braunfeld, [though] combined with Thomas it significantly transforms
Braunfeld's direct/indirect distinction.").
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more expensive is not a priori insubstantial merely because it is indirect, it still
may fail to rise to the level of a substantial burden. "9 Furthermore, many
lower courts' decisions reiterate that merely making the practice of religion
more expensive is not a substantial burden. 91 In general, these expressions
of what the Supreme Court has decided does and does not constitute a substantial
burden provide a framework to analyze the degree to which laws requiring
landlords to rent to unmarried tenants conflict with the landlords' exercise of
religion.
2. The Burden Is Not Substantial
To refute the landlords' argument that the burden imposed on them is
substantial as evaluated under one of these formulations, the tenants' strongest
arguments are first, that the commercial context in which landlords operate their
business lessens the religious significance of the landlords' exercise of religion
and justifies compliance with anti-discrimination laws. Second, merely making
the practice of religion more expensive is not a substantial burden. For these
reasons, the burden upon the exercise of landlords' religion is not substantial,
and thus the strict scrutiny standard of RFRA is not triggered.
The first reason that requiring landlords to rent to unmarried couples is not
a substantial burden on the exercise of their religion is due to the commercial
context in which landlords are exercising their religion. In United States v.
Lee,"9 the Supreme Court held that the religious adherent's beliefs, which
forbade the payment and receipt of social security benefits, did not exempt the
adherent from the obligation to pay the required tax. 93 The commercial
activity which was before the Lee Court was a carpentry business which thus
The
entailed the employer's payment of employees' social security taxes.'

190. Goodall v. Stafford County Sch. Bd., 60 F.3d 168, 171 (4th Cir. 1995) ("It is well
established that there is no substantial burden placed on an individual's free exercise of religion
where a law or policy merely 'operates so as to make the practice of [the individual's] religious
beliefs more expensive.'" (citing Braunfeld)).
191. Id. Accord Lakewood, Ohio Congregation of Jehovah's Witnesses, Inc. v. City of
Lakewood, Ohio, 699 F.2d 303, 306-07 (6th Cir. 1983); Healy v. Independent Sch. Dist, No. 3-90
CIV 46, 1991 WU 337534, at *4 (D. Minn. Mar. 5, 1991); Congregation Beth Yitzchok of
Rockland, Inc. v. Town of Ramapo, 593 F. Supp. 655, 659 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); Smith v. Fair
Employment & Hous. Comm'n, 913 P.2d 909, 926-27 (Cal. 1996).
192. 455 U.S. 252 (1982). The petitioner in Lee was a member of the Old Order Amish who
employed others to work on his farm and in his carpentry shop. Id. at 254. He believed that there
is a religiously-based duty to provide for other members of his faith. Id. at 254-55. In fact, the
Amish believe it sinful to not provide for their own elderly and that these beliefs prohibit any sort
of contribution to the federal social security system. Id. at 255.
193. Id. at 257, 260. The reasoning of the Court seems to be in the context of an analysis of
"compelling interest," but much of its reasoning also supports the absence of a substantial burden.
194. Id. at 254.
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Court reasoned that "[t ] o maintain an organized society that guarantees religious
freedom to a great variety of faiths requires that some religious practices yield
The Court further reasoned that not every religious
to the common good.'
adherent can avoid all the burdens which are caused by "exercising every aspect
of the right to practice religious beliefs."" Additionally, the Court noted that
when religious persons voluntarily enter a commercial activity, the religious
doctrine which they accept as controlling in their lives cannot be "superimposed
on the statutory schemes which are binding on others in that activity.""
The reasoning of the Court in Lee indicates that the burden on landlords is
not substantial. The Court seems to indicate that with regard to commercial
activity, it is accepted that there are laws which regulate the behavior of
participants in that activity. In the case of a business, for example, employers
are prohibited from discriminating in their hiring and firing practices,"'
required to pay the minimum wage, 199 required to pay taxes on behalf of
employees, 20° and required to prevent or stop workplace harassment. 20°
Renting apartments to individuals is a commercial activity. Similarly, the rental
of housing is regulated by anti-discrimination laws.2'e Such laws are enacted
in accordance with various public policies and are thus considered to be
reasonable. As it is reasonable for persons who set up a business to be required
to comply with the laws that regulate their activity, it is also reasonable to
require that landlords also obey such laws.
The implications of the Lyng formulation of substantial burden are best
dealt with in the commercial context. In Lyng, a burden was substantial if a
person is coerced into violating her beliefs. 2°3 Landlords in marital status
discrimination cases have used the Lyng test by arguing that the prohibition
against discriminating against unmarried couples and any attendant penalties for
noncompliance coerce them to violate their beliefs regarding the sinfulness of
unmarried couples' behavior and is thus a substantial burden. 2'
This
argument, however, should not succeed because it is their voluntary entry into
the commercial context which has caused the conflict. Thus, it is not solely the
government's "coercion" which instigates the conflict because the landlords

195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
statutes.
203.
204.

Id. at 259.
Id. at 261.
Id.
42 U.S.C.
29 U.S.C.
26 U.S.C.
42 U.S.C.
42 U.S.C.

§ 2000e-2(a) (1994).
§ 206 (1994).
88 3301-3311 (1994); 26 U.S.C. §§ 3101-3128 (1994).
§ 2000e-2(a) (1994).
§ 3601-19, 3631 (1994). See supra note 130 for cites of relevant state

Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 449 (1988).
Smith v. Fair Employment & Hous. Comm'n, 913 P.2d 909, 922-24 (Cal. 1996).
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themselves have decided to enter the business of renting apartments. This type
of a situation is different from that of the employment at issue in the Sherbert
Quartet." In those cases, the employees were engaged in a less proactive and
more "everyday" situation. They were employees, not employers."'
Furthermore, not only are landlords in these cases exercising their religion
in a commercial setting, but they entered that commercial setting voluntarily.
In Wisconsin v. Yoder,2' 7 there was no way to avoid the conflict between the
parents' wishes to school their children and the state's educational
Simply living in Wisconsin was enough for those petitioners'
requirement.'
religion to clash with state law. Similarly, the petitioners in the cases
comprising the Sherbert Quartet, 2' the second formulation of substantial
burden, did not choose to enter an activity which clashed with their religious
beliefs. Rather, each was an employee whose employer's requests conflicted
with their beliefs. Any of those petitioners could have encountered the same
problem in many other jobs. In the case of landlords, however, they chose a
less common commercial activity-and for all intents and purposes, started a
business-which has laws against refusing to rent to unmarried couples. It is not
a burden on their religious practices to refrain from engaging in the business of
renting apartments, nor would it be as great a financial burden to engage in
another commercial activity as it was to the petitioners in the Sherbert Quartet
cases.21 ° The California Supreme Court recently indicated that the ability of
the religious adherent to avoid the burden was one of many factors which the
Supreme Court had used prior to Employment Division v. Smith to determine the
existence of a substantial burden.2 ' This possibility of avoidance was one of
the factors by which the California court determined that a landlord was not
substantially burdened by the law prohibiting discrimination against unmarried
cohabitants.212

205. See supra note 57 for cites to the cases of the Sherbert Quartet and their facts.
206. While the landlords may not employ others per se, they still took on the responsibility of
initiating an enterprise, rather than looking for another person's enterprise for which to work for a
wage.
207. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
208. Id. at 218. The law which Wisconsin enacted compelled all students to attend secondary
school under threat of criminal sanction. Id.
209. See supra note 57 for an explanation of the Sherbert Quartet.
210. See Smith v. Fair Employment & Hous. Comm'n, 913 P.2d 909, 925 (Cal. 1996).
211. See id. "The proposition that a burden on religion is not substantial if one can avoid it
without violating one's religious beliefs is not of itself . . . [a] test for identifying substantial
burden"; however, it is a factor to consider and it is one which finds support in cases prior to
Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). Smith, 913 P.2d at 925.
212. Smith, 913 P.2d at 926-27.
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In Swanner v. Anchorage Equal Rights Commission,"3 a case which
involved the free exercise right of landlords as against the rights of unmarried
cohabitants to housing, the Alaska Supreme Court came to a similar conclusion
about the relation of the voluntariness of the action to the burden. The landlord
in Swanner argued that the burden placed upon him was that he was forced to
choose between ignoring his religious beliefs or giving up his livelihood of the
property-rental business.2" 4 The Alaska Supreme Court, however, rejected the
landlord's argument by noting that the landlord entered the property-rental
business completely voluntarily and in full knowledge that it was an area
covered by anti-discrimination laws with which he was obligated to comply.2" 5
Ultimately, the Swanner court held that religious activity engaged within the
context of voluntary commercial activity was not deserving of the same
protection under free exercise doctrine as purely religious activity.2 6 The

213. 874 P.2d 274 (Alaska 1994).
214. Id. at 283.
215. Id.; Cooper v. French, 460 N.W.2d 2, 15 (Minn. 1990) (Popovich, C.J., dissenting).
216. Swanner, 874 P.2d at 283. Examining the landlord's activity in light of its commercial
nature allows judges to distance themselves from the socially-charged battle between tenants' housing
rights and landlords' free exercise of religion. Kelly D. Eckel, Legitimate Limitation of a
Landlord's Rights-A New Dawn for Unmarried Cohabitants, 68 TEMp. L. REV. 811, 818, 840
(1995). Thus, courts are able to create a more objective framework within which to analyze the
competing interests. Id. at 840.
Despite Thomas v. Review Board's proper conclusion that the Supreme Court must refrain
from passing judgment on the centrality or appropriateness of religious adherents' beliefs, it is
difficult to get away from at least some consideration of the centrality of the burdened religious
observance to the believer's faith. See Lakewood, Ohio Congregation of Jehovah's Witnesses, Inc.
v. City of Lakewood, Ohio, 699 F.2d 303, 306 (6th Cir. 1983) (While "[rieligious observances in
the form of beliefs are absolutely protected from governmental infringement . . . [, piractices
flowing from the religious beliefs merit protection when they are shown to be integrally related to
the underlying beliefs." (citing Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940))).
In Lakewood, a congregation of Jehovah's Witnesses sought to build a church in an area of
a community in which such buildings were not allowed under the zoning ordinances. Lakewood,
699 F.2d at 304-05. The petitioners argued that their free exercise of religion was burdened by the
zoning ordinances. Id. at 305. The court, however, analyzed the religious observance in this case
as being the construction of a church building. Id. at 306. The court reasoned that there was no
evidence that this "observance" was a "fundamental tenet" or a "cardinal principle" of its faith. Id.
at 307. The court held that the zoning restriction imposed only an indirect financial burden because
there were still areas in the community where building churches was possible, even if they were
more expensive. Id. The Lakewood court found that "[n]o pressure [was] placed on the
congregation to abandon its beliefs and observances." Id.
Whether the burden on free exercise is substantial depends on what the religious belief actually
involves. One of the underlying beliefs which is driving the conflict between religious landlords and
tenants is that fornication is sinful. See supra note 14. Prohibition of marital status discrimination
does not cause landlords to personally violate their beliefs by committing the act which the landlords
consider sinful. Rather, there is another layer of sinful conduct which landlords argue that marital
status discrimination laws force them to commit-the facilitation of sin. See supra note 14. Since
Christian teachings advocate that Christians be morally responsible in the use of their property,
renting an apartment to people who are engaging in sinful conduct is arguably a sin. Telephone
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dissent in Cooper v. French,2 17 a case from the Minnesota Supreme Court,
echoed the conclusions of the Lee and Swanner courts and added that the Free
Exercise Clause does not "bestow upon the individual an absolute right to
require others in the marketplace to adopt those values as a precondition to
doing business with him or her.'218
The tenants' second argument that laws preventing a landlord from
discriminating against unmarried couples are not a substantial burden finds its
support in the Supreme Court's decision in Braunfeld v. Brown.219 The
Braunfeld Court held that making the practice of religion more expensive is not

Interview with Rev. Doug Mayer, former Director-Chaplain, St. Teresa of Avila Catholic Student
Center (Feb. 20, 1996). Nonetheless, this facilitation of sin has two components. The first is the
refusal to engage in the rental transaction with unmarried cohabitants because they presumably
engage in premarital sex. One commentator makes the argument that the presumption, without
actual knowledge, of the occurrence of sexual intercourse between unmarried couples and landlords'
not seeking to avoid renting to single or married tenants who engage in sinful sexual activity makes
the landlords' exercise of religion inconsistent. See Markey, supra note 10, at 823-24. However,
the religious beliefs of those who do not believe in premarital intercourse and common sense permit
landlords this seeming inconsistency. Telephone Interview with Sister Marilyn Ring, Associate
Campus Chaplain, Augustana College Campus Ministries (Feb. 8, 1996). It cannot be denied that
this action is motivated by religion. Mayer, supra. The Swanner court did not disagree that the
refusal to rent apartments in this type of situation is sufficiently religious to satisfy the court's
constitutional test. Swanner, 874 P.2d at 282.
The second action is that of renting the apartment itself. No landlord has yet argued that
renting apartments is a religious duty. The court in Swanner addressed that argument and rejected
it, though the court's opinion does not indicate that the landlord actually made that contention. Id.
at 283. The court in Jasniowski v. Rushing, 94 CH 5546 (Cook County Cir. Ct. Dec. 22, 1994),
similarly noted that the landlord in that case had made no showing of a religious belief which
required him to rent apartments to others. Id. at 10. If renting apartments is not religiously
motivated, then the argument that the landlords' free exercise of religion is burdened is more
attenuated, both under free exercise jurisprudence and under RFRA. While First Amendment
jurisprudence protects the exercise of religion even when the conduct is not considered to be a
"religious ritual," (Attorney Gen. v. Desilets, 636 N.E.2d 233, 237 (Mass. 1994)), if the conduct
is not concerning the exercise of religion, then it is not protected under constitutional free exercise
jurisprudence. Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 713 (1981) ("Only beliefs rooted in religion
are protected by the Free Exercise Clause, which, by its terms, gives special protection to the
exercise of religion.") Furthermore, the legislative history of RFRA indicates that RFRA is only
intended to protect action which is motivated by religion. Douglas Laycock, RFRA, Congressand
the Ratchet, 56 MONT. L. REv. 145, 151 (1995). Nonetheless, the argument that renting apartments
is not mandated by religion has failed overall.
217. 460 N.W.2d 2, 11 (1990) (Popovich, C.J., dissenting).
218. Id. at 15 (Popovich, C.J., dissenting).
Appellant is free, in his private life, to not associate with anyone whom he feels has the
.appearance of evil," but when someone voluntarily enters the public marketplace he
may encounter laws that are inconsistent with his religious beliefs .... [Siuch a burden
is greatly lessened because it occurred only when [the landlord] voluntarily entered into
the rental marketplace. ...
Id.
219. Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961).
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a substantial burden on the exercise of religion.'
In the case of marital status
discrimination in housing, laws which prohibit landlords from discriminating
against potential tenants because they are unmarried couples increase the costs
that these landlords face in two ways. One manner in which the practice of
their religion is made more expensive is that if landlords ignore the antidiscriminatory law and continue to refuse to rent to unmarried couples, they will
incur fines.22' The other manner which increases expenses for landlords is
that they may chose to avoid renting their apartments to unmarried couples and
thus not earn income from their rental business222 or may have to expend
money to create a new source of income.223
The added expense which was deemed insubstantial in Braunfeld is very
similar to the second form of landlords' added expense. In Braunfeld, the
merchants were faced with a choice of a competitive economic disadvantage by
not working on Saturdays, or engaging in some other occupation which did not
pose such problems.224 The Court reasoned that the Sunday closing law was
not burdensome because it merely regulated a secular activity, and may not even
have affected all of the followers of the religion. 5 Similarly, landlords are
engaged in the secular activity of renting apartments.
Marital status
discrimination laws are, the tenants would argue, merely a means to regulate
this secular activity.226 Moreover, if the possibility of the merchants in
Braunfeld being effectively forced to abandon their chosen occupation due to
their religion's mandates is not a substantial burden, then the same difficult
choice which faces landlords is similarly not substantial.227
This Note does not intend to deny that laws preventing landlords from
discriminating against unmarried couples, or punishing them for doing so, is not
a burden upon the exercise of the landlords' religion. However, the fact that
these laws are burdensome does not result in the conclusion that they are a

220. Id. at 605.
221. In Donahue, the landlord was ordered to pay to the tenants damages of $1023 for the
couple's lost income while they looked for alternative housing, $75 per month for increased cost in
rent until the tenants found housing comparably priced to that which Ms. Donahue had, and $6000
to both prospective tenants for emotional injuries. Donahue v. Fair Employ. & Hous. Comm'n, 2
Cal. Rptr. 2d 32, 34 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991). In French, the landlord was ordered to pay the potential
tenant $368.50 in compensatory damages and $400 in damages for mental anguish and suffering.
Cooper v. French, 460 N.W.2d 2, 3 (Minn. 1990). The landlord was also required to pay a civil
penalty of $300 to the state. Id.
222. The landlord in Swannerv. AnchorageEqual Rights Commission made this argument. 874
P.2d 274, 279 (Alaska 1994).
223. Smith v. Fair Employment & Hous. Comm'n, 913 P.2d 909, 926 (Cal. 1996).
224. Braunfeld, 366 U.S. at 606.
225. Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 605-06 (1961).
226. Smith, 913 P.2d at 923.
227. See id.
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substantial burden. By failing to constitute a substantial burden, these laws
cannot be evaded by employing RFRA as a defense against discrimination
claims. 28 In the alternative, however, that the burden imposed upon landlords
was determined to be substantial by the Supreme Court, marital status
discrimination laws would be subject to the strict scrutiny analysis under RFRA
and would survive. If courts were to follow this analysis, tenants would win
their claims. However, not all courts are reaching this conclusion. Courts are
inappropriately extending the legitimate protections which RFRA provides to
landlords who discriminate against unmarried couples.
B. Satisfying the Requirements of RFRA
Avoiding the application of RFRA" 9 is only one method of dealing with
the fact that the passage of RFRA has likely reinforced landlords' free exercise
defenses." ° There is also a second method to avoid RFRA's imputed effect
on unmarried couples' access to housing. This method entails satisfying the
requirements of RFRA, which allows the free exercise of religion to be
substantially burdened if the burden is justified by a compelling state interest and
accomplished by the least restrictive means."
Although only the Alaska
Supreme Court has determined that protecting unmarried couples' equal access
to housing is a compelling interest,23 there are valid reasons that such an
interest is compelling.

228. See Fliegel, supra note 42, at 61; 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-l(a) (1994); see also supra text
accompanying note 160.
229. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to bb-4 (1994). See supra text accompanying notes 152-54 for an
explanation of how to avoid the application of RFRA.
230. Landlords' defenses are reinforced because RFRA has statutorily supplemented the
protection of the Free Exercise Clause. See supra notes 115, 138-41 and accompanying text.
231. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-l(b) (1994).
232. See Swanner v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n, 874 P.2d 274 (Alaska 1994). Justice
Thomas wrote a dissenting opinion which accompanied the Court's denial of certiorari in Swanner.
Swanner v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n, 115 S. Ct. 460 (1994). Justice Thomas noted that
state courts are having difficulty applying the Sherbert-Yoder test to the issue of marital status
discrimination. Id. at 462. Thomas also doubted that Alaska had a compelling interest in
preventing discrimination according to marital status. Id. at 461. He placed a great deal of
emphasis upon other areas of federal and Alaskan law which sanction discrimination based on
marital status. Id. It must be noted, however, that opinions accompanying denial of certiorari do
not have the same precedential value as opinions on the merits. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 296
(1989). The purpose of such opinions is limited to making the view of the particular Justice(s)
known, for better or worse. Singleton v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 439 U.S. 940, 944-45
(1978) (opinion of Mr. Justice Stevens respecting the denial of the petition for writ of certiorari)
(stating that opinions dissenting from the denial of certiorari are "totally unnecessary," are merely
dicta, and can even be counterproductive because they are unanswered).
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1. Compelling Governmental Interest
Several arguments justify why preventing landlords from denying unmarried
These
cohabitants equal access to housing is a compelling interest. 233

arguments include:

first, that the eradication of discrimination based on

arbitrary factors is very important to society in the area of housing, which is a
2
second, allowing landlords a free exercise
1
universal human necessityM;
defense would impose their religious beliefs upon third parties; third, allowing
religious defenses to trump civil rights legislation such as the Fair Housing Act
threatens the protection of all anti-discrimination laws; 235 and finally, society's
interest in requiring compliance with anti-discrimination laws is greater in the
commercial context.236
The most important reason that prohibiting landlords from interfering with
unmarried couples' access to housing is a compelling interest is that housing is
a basic human need.237 All people need shelter. Moreover, unmarried
cohabitants have a right to the "full choice of available housing accommodations
Understandably, how the
enjoyed by others in the rental market. "23
government interest is expressed plays an important part in determining whether
the interest is compelling. 239 For example, the Massachusetts Supreme Court
in Attorney General v. Desilets framed the interest as "the elimination of

233. See Eckel, supra note 216, at 840-45; Markey, supra note 10, at 771, 787-95; Swanner,
874 P.2d at 282-84 (holding that denying housing to unmarried couples is an independent social evil
which the state has an "interest of the highest order" in preventing); Attorney General v. Desilets,
636 N.E.2d 233 (Mass. 1994) (holding that there would be a compelling state interest if upon
remand, it were determined that findings showed that allowing such landlords to discriminate based
on marital status would have an actual effect upon unmarried tenants' acquisition of housing).
234. Markey, supra note 10, at 787-88, 793.
235. While the landlords' religious defense has not yet actually trumped the FHA because
currently the FHA does not prohibit marital status discrimination, the landlords' religious defenses
have trumped one state's fair housing laws, and likely a second. See Attorney Gen. v. Desilets, 636
N.E.2d 233 (Mass. 1994); Cooper v. French, 460 N.W.2d 2 (Minn. 1990). See also supra note
130.
236. See Eckel, supra note 216, at 845.
237. Markey, supra note 10, at 793; Cooper, 460 N.W.2d at 16 (Popovich, C.J., dissenting).
238. Smith v. Fair Employment & Hous. Comm'n, 913 P.2d 909 (Cal. 1996).
239. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 199 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
This case is no more about "a fundamental right to engage in homosexual sodomy," as
the Court purports to declare ... than Stanley v. Georgia... was about a fundamental
right to watch obscene movies, or Katz v. United States . . . was about a fundamental
right to place interstate bets from a telephone booth. Rather, this case is about. . . "the
right to be let alone."
Id. (citations omitted); Swamer v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n, 874 P.2d 274, 283 (Alaska
1994). See also Markey, supra note 10, at 788-89 (stating that defining the state's interest broadly
would make it easy to show that the interest is compelling; while defining the interest narrowly
would make the state "utterly unable to show the importance of such an interest').
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discrimination in housing against an unmarried man and an unmarried woman
"4
who have a sexual relationship and wish to rent accommodations ....
This is not the most accurate way to express the interest involved. Instead, the
appropriate expression of the interest is to provide "discrimination-free access
Only this latter expression of the interest takes into
to housing." 24'
consideration the importance of equal access to housing for all people. The
Supreme Court has clearly indicated that eradicating invidious discrimination is
a compelling interest.242
Furthermore, the factors which may justify a distinction between married
couples and unmarried couples in other areas of the law are not present in the
issue of housing. 243 Some courts have reasoned that states validly distinguish
unmarried persons from married persons in other areas of law because society
has historically accorded certain benefits only to persons who were married. 2'
Examples of such benefits under state law include the marital communication
privilege, the ability to collect tort damages for loss of consortium, intestate

240. Desilets, 636 N.E.2d at 238. Another argument against this phrasing of the governmental
interest is that some landlords have rejected male and female friends as tenants. Thus, landlords
seem to assume the presence of a sexual relationship between any male-female pair of prospective
tenants. Does the state have a compelling interest in ensuring the access to housing for a pair of
friends who are not engaging in any immoral conduct with each other?
241. Donahue v. Fair Employment & Hous. Comm'n, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 32, 49 (Cal. Ct. App.
1991) (Grignon, J., dissenting). Similarly, the dissent in Cooper v. French stated the interest as
"[piroviding equal access to housing in Minnesota by eliminating pernicious discrimination,
Cooper v. French, 460 N.W.2d 2, 16 (Minn. 1990)
including marital status discrimination ....
(Popovich, C.J., dissenting).
242. Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 626 (1984) (finding that the state had a
compelling interest in eliminating discrimination based on gender); Bob Jones Univ. v. United
States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983) (finding that there was a compelling interest in eliminating
discrimination in education according to race).
See Wistner, supra note 49, at 1097 (noting that the differences between race and gender
discrimination and that of marital status discrimination ultimately do not prevent finding a
compelling interest in eradicating discrimination in housing).
243. Malgorzata K. Laskowska, Comment, "No Sinners Under My Roof": Can California
Landlords Refuse to Rent to Unmarried Couples by Claiming a Religious Freedom of Exercise
Exemptionfrom a Statute Which ProhibitsMaritalStatus Discrimination?,36 SANTA CLARA L. REv.
219, 249 (1995); Wistner, supra note 49, at 1102 ("These differences show that the state does not
have a compelling interest in treating unmarried couples the same as married couples at all times.
However, it does not mean that there is not a compelling interest in the area of eradicating
discrimination in housing.").
244. Donahue, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 44-45 (listing several instances of California law where there
is a "disfavored legal status of cohabitation without marriage": suits for loss of consortium,
unemployment compensation, conjugal prison visits, wrongful death actions, no marital
communication privilege); Smith v. Fair Employment & Hous. Comm'n, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 395, 405
(Cal. Ct. App. 1994) (same); Cooper v. French, 460 N.W.2d 2, 6 (Minn. 1990) (indicating that
Minnesota's seldom-used fornication statute signifies disfavor of unmarried couples).
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succession and coverage on health insurance policies.245 The court in Swanner
v. Anchorage Equal Rights Connission,24 however, properly rejected this
approach and distinguished an unmarried partner's interest in housing from that
in other areas of law.247 The Swanner court accomplished this by reasoning
that in other areas of law, an unmarried partner stood to gain-almost always
financially-by claiming to be romantically involved,248 while in the situation
of housing, an unmarried couple only hoped to be treated equally in spite of
being romantically involved.249 Further, the Swanner court noted that due to
the possibility of fraudulently obtaining benefits, and the difficulty of
determining whose bonds were genuine enough to be entitled to these benefits,
it was permissible to require a marriage license in these other situations."o
Even though the Supreme Court has held that there is no constitutional right
to housing,25 the Court has similarly held that there is no constitutional right
to education.252 However, the fact that our highest Court has determined that
certain interests are not constitutionally protected does not prevent Congress and
state legislatures from recognizing how vital these interests are to citizens and
enacting laws to protect these interests. 3 For example, seventeen state
legislatures have enacted laws indicating their public policy in providing equality

245. Donahue, 2 Cal. Rptr.2d at 44-45 (citations omitted); Swannerv. Anchorage Equal Rights
Comm'n, 874 P.2d 274 (Alaska 1994) (Moore, C.J., dissenting).
246. 874 P.2d 274 (Alaska 1994).
247. Id. at 283.
248. Id. And thus to prevent a multitude of people claiming benefits from the government by
reason of their "bond" to another, states are justified in requiring the "genuine bond" of marriage.
Id.
249. Id. Additionally, the Swanner court stated that the Alaska state government had a
compelling interest in preventing discrimination in housing against unmarried cohabitants because
such discrimination "degrades individuals, affronts human dignity, and limits one's opportunities.
• .. " Id. at 283.
250. Id.
251. Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972). "The Constitution has not federalized the
substantive law of landlord-tenant relations. . . ." Id. at 68. "We do not denigrate the importance
of decent, safe and sanitary housing. But the Constitution does not provide judicial remedies for
every social and economic ill .... Absent constitutional mandate, the assurance of adequate housing
and the definition of landlord-tenant relationships are legislative, not judicial, functions." Id. at 74.
252. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 2 (1973) ("Though education
is one of the most important services performed by the State, it is not within the limited category
of rights recognized by this Court as guaranteed by the Constitution.").
253. Otto J. Hetzel, A Perspective on Legal Issues in Housing Discrimination,in ISSUES IN
HOUSING DISCRIMINATION: A CONSULTATIONIHEARING OF THE UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON
CIVIL RIGHTS 115, 123 (1985). Examples of this are fair housing laws, namely: 42 U.S.C. §§
3601-19, 3631 (1994) and Title VII, which forbids discrimination in employment: 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-2(a) (1994). See supra note 109 (explaining how Congress can create statutory rights which
exceed the protections granted in the Constitution). Such a federal decision will affect states by
making them unable to protect civil rights which may differ from federal law. Cordish, supra note
118, at 2128.
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in housing, and that marital status discrimination is an impediment to this
policy. 4 New York's fair housing law reflects the vital interest people have
in equal access to housing by declaring that:
the failure to provide such equal opportunity, whether because of
discrimination ... or inadequate... housing. . not only threatens
the rights and proper privileges of its inhabitants but menaces the
institutions and foundation of a free democratic state and threatens the
peace, order, health, safety and general welfare of the state and its
inhabitants.3"
Housing is so essential to all persons that it is one situation where the
government's interest should be defined broadly to ensure that all have equal
access to housing.256

254. These statutes are to be distinguished from those discussed earlier. See supra note 130
and accompanying text. These statutes do not merely prohibit discrimination based on marital status,
but they indicate a purpose for prohibiting such discrimination. The statutes can generally be
divided into two types: those that merely state that marital status discrimination is against that state's
public policy, and those that are more emphatic concerning the right to housing and what impact
marital discrimination has upon that right. California's statute is an example of the former category,
and states that "the practice of discrimination because of . . . marital status . . . in housing
accommodations is declared to be against public policy." CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12920 (West 1992
& Supp. 1997). Similarly, Michigan's statute declares: "[t]he opportunity to obtain . . . housing
... without discrimination because of ... marital status as prohibited by this act, is recognized and
declared to be a civil right." MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 37.2101 (West Supp. 1995). New York's
statute is an example of the latter category, stating that:
[t]he legislature hereby finds and declares that the state has the responsibility to act to
assure that every individual within this state is afforded an equal opportunity to enjoy
a full and productive life and that the failure to provide such equal opportunity, whether
because of discrimination . . . or inadequate . . . housing . . . not only threatens the
rights and proper privileges of its inhabitants but menaces the institutions and foundation
of a free democratic state and threatens the peace, order, health, safety and general
welfare of the state and its inhabitants.
N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 290 (McKinney 1993).
The remaining statutes are: ALASKA STAT. §§ 18.80.200 & 18.80.210 (1994); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 6, § 4601 (1993); HAW. REV. STAT. § 368-1 (Supp. 1992); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.
5, § 4552 (1989); MD. ANN. CODE art. 49B, § 19 (1994); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 598B.020
(Michie 1986); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 354-A: 8 (1995); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10: 5-3 (West Supp.
1995); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.4-01 (Supp. 1995) ("status with regard to marriage'); OR. REV.
STAT. § 659.020(1) (1995) (stating public policy against marital status discrimination generally, not
specifically in housing); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 34-37-1 (1995); VA. CODE ANN. § 2.1-715 (Michie
1995); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 49.60.010 (West Supp. 1995); Wis. SrAT. ANN. § 101.22 (West
Supp. 1995).
255. N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 290 (McKinney 1982).256. Markey, supra note 10, at 36-37.
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Tenants' second argument that prohibiting landlords from discriminating
against unmarried cohabitants is a compelling governmental interest is that in
this situation, unlike those in which religious claimants have prevailed, the rights
and interests of third parties are unfairly affected by the landlord's religious
preferences. In the Supreme Court's unemployment cases, such as Sherbert v.
Verner, 7 it is the religious claimant who experiences the primary effect of the
government's law. 5
In contrast, the belief at issue in marital status
discrimination cases does not purely affect the religious adherent; rather, third
parties-who are outside the faith-are significantly impacted as well. 9 The
plurality in the recent California Supreme Court case, Smith v. FairEmployment
& Housing Commission,2W echoed this argument. That court found that "to
permit [the landlord] to discriminate would sacrifice the rights of her prospective
tenants to have equal access to public accommodations and their legal and
dignity interests in freedom from discrimination based on personal
characteristics. " 261 In the Supreme Court's unemployment cases, there was
no similar impact upon third parties.262 While there was an arguable effect
upon the employers in those cases in that they had to pay unemployment benefits
to employees who quit, the severity and directness of impact upon the third
party is not comparable.263 Thus, because the landlords' religiously-motivated
action imposes the landlords' beliefs on prospective tenants, this situation is
different than that of the unemployment compensation in Sherbert.
Landlords may also analogize to their situation by arguing that third parties
were affected in another Supreme Court case, Wisconsin v. Yoder-a case in
which the religious adherents prevailed. 2" These third parties were the Amish

257. 374 U.S. 398 (1963). See supra note 57 for citations to the other unemployment
compensation cases.
258. Smith v. Fair Employment & Hous. Comm'n, 913 P.2d 909, 925 (Cal. 1996).
259. Id.; Markey, supra note 10, at 831 n.550.
260. 913 P.2d 909 (Cal. 1996). In Smith, the landlady, Ms. Smith owned four rental units.
Id. at 912. Due to Ms. Smith's religious beliefs, she opposed sex outside of marriage. Id. So
many unmarried couples had called her over the years seeking to rent apartments that she began to
tell prospective tenants that she preferred renting to married couples. Id. One day the complainants
went together to see the landlady's apartments, the respondent told them she preferred renting to
married couples, and complainants falsely represented that they were married. Id. at 913. The
complainants signed a lease and paid a security deposit, and then upon respondent's later
questioning, informed her that they were not married. Id. The respondent replied that she would
not rent to them, and she returned their security deposit. Id. The complainants brought suit,
alleging that respondent violated the California fair housing provision. Id. The Fair Employment
& Housing Commission decided in favor of the complainants and ordered Smith to cease
discriminating according to marital status, to post in her building the provisions of California's fair
housing act and the outcome of the instant case. Id. at 914.
261. Id. at 925.
262. Id.
263. Id.
264. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
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children whose educational fate was decided in that case. Yoder, however, can
be distinguished from landlords and apartment rental to unmarried
cohabitants. 2 In the former, the third parties were members of the faith who
arguably shared similar beliefs. In the latter, the third parties are not members
of the same faith and do not necessarily share the same beliefs. Additionally,
in Yoder a parental relationship existed between the petitioners and the "third
parties."2s While the dissent in Yoder raised the issue of the possible conflict
between parental and children's rights in religious training and upbringing,6 7
the majority stated that that issue was not before the Court, and that as such, it
did not wish to contradict the Court's precedent in that area of the law. 2" No
such comparable relationship exists between landlords and tenants. These two
factors are sufficient to allow the effect upon third parties in Yoder while
prohibiting the effect upon third parties in the situation of unmarried couples.
A third argument that preventing landlords' RFRA-based religious defenses
from impeding unmarried couples' access to housing is a compelling interest is
that if the landlords' arguments were to succeed, many other anti-discrimination
laws may be threatened.269 This argument was raised in a district court case
from Hawaii, Abordo v. Hawaii.27
In that case, the plaintiff argued that
"RFRA impermissibly strengthens the right to free exercise of religion at the
expense of other rights." 71 The plaintiff enumerated several laws which
RFRA threatened: age discrimination laws, laws protecting access to abortion
clinics, fair housing laws and a school district's policy prohibiting weapons from
being carried on campus. 2" Unfortunately, the Abordo court rejected the
plaintiffs argument.273 The court reasoned that merely listing situations in

265. See Smith v. Fair Employment & Hous. Comm'n, 913 P.2d 909, 928 (Cal. 1996).
266. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 231 (while stating that the Court did not reach nor decide the issue,
in dicta, the Court stated that "[r]ecognition of the claim of the State in such a proceeding would,
of course, call into question traditional concepts of parental control over the religious upbringing and
education of their minor children recognized in this Court's past decisions").
267. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 241-42 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
268. Id. at 230-32.
269. Eckel, supra note 216, at 844 (noting that specifically, laws proscribing race and sexual
orientation discrimination could also be subject to religious objections),
270. 902 F. Supp 1220, 1233 (D. Haw. 1995). In Abordo, the plaintiff was an inmate at a
correctional facility. Id. at 1222-23. He filed a § 1983 action when prison officials cut his long hair
despite his objections. Id. at 1223. Plaintiff filed suit, claiming, inter alia, his rights under RFRA
were violated. Id. Plaintiff argued that his religion was the reason his hair was long, specifically,
that according to the plaintiff's religion, long hair symbolizes manhood and personal spiritual
strength to the Native Americans; his hair was used as a sacrifice to render answered prayers and
that long hair is Christ-like. Id, at 2225. The District Court held that it was reasonable for the
Magistrate below to find that the plaintiff's rights may have been violated and denied the defendants'
motion for summary judgment on this issue. Id.
271. Id. at 1233.
272. Id.
273. Id.
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which RFRA may "abrogate or dilute other rights" does not constitute a
successful facial challenge of RFRA. 74 Other commentators, however, have
not dismissed the danger which RFRA, and the exemptions which the strict
scrutiny test provide, poses to anti-discrimination laws.Y In our efforts to
accommodate the religious beliefs of our citizens, we should not forget that
eradicating discrimination is, as a general proposition, a compelling
governmental interest. 76 These commentators note that the deference which
is granted to religious beliefs and the various sorts of religious beliefs which
could be claimed to be burdened would threaten the anti-discrimination gains for
which so many have fought. 2" Justice Scalia recognized this danger as well
in Employment Division v. Smith. 78 In the Smith majority opinion, Justice
Scalia explained that the judiciary was not capable of judging the merits of a
multitude of religious claimants seeking exemption from laws because they
conflicted with their religious beliefs. 79 Because of the difficult and sensitive

274. Id.
275. Eckel, supra note 216, at 844; Markey, supra note 10, at 809; Laskowska, supra note
243, at 234.
276. Markey, supra note 10, at 793.
277. Eckel, supra note 216, at 844; Markey, supra note 10, at 809; Laskowska, supra note
243, at 234. An examination of a hypothetical scenario may help demonstrate the state's compelling
interest in prohibiting marital status discrimination in housing. Suppose a landlord's religion forbids
interracial dating or marriage. Such a religious tenet is not out of the range of possibility. For
instance, in Bob Jones Univeristy v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983), the sponsors of the
University genuinely believed that the Bible forbade interracial dating and marriage. Id. at 580.
If a married interracial couple were to approach that landlord to rent an apartment, the landlord may
refuse to rent to that couple, based on his religious beliefs. The landlord's interest in that situation
would be to protect his right to exercise his religion as he sees fit. Unfortunately, the landlord is
seeking to practice his belief not only in a commercial situation, but also in a way which
disadvantages others in their search for housing. The answer to this hypothetical seems clear:
society should not allow the landlord to effectuate his beliefs in this manner. There is no acceptable
reason that the landlord should discriminate against these potential tenants because of their race. The
situation in this hypothetical is analogous to the situation of marital status discrimination.
Opponents of this conclusion may argue that there is a horrible legacy of American racial
discrimination which allows the interest in preventing discrimination to trump the exercise of religion
in this hypothetical. However, in spite of this, it must be recognized that through time the groups
which are disadvantaged, yet should be protected, change. Not allowing for this change forces
society to remain stagnant. As the dissent in Cooper v. French stated:
Itmay be difficult for some individuals to recognize invidious discrimination, but one
must not lose sight of the continuing fight of minorities to be protected from a "probable
majority" point of view. It was not long ago that blacks and women were widely
viewed as second-class citizens. Discrimination [today] usually comes in less obvious
forms-such as against single parents, those with AIDS, homosexuals, the elderly, and
those living together-but no less invidious forms.
Cooper v. French, 460 N.W.2d 2, 17 (Minn. 1990) (Popovich, C.J., dissenting).
278. 494 U.S. 872, 885 (1990).
279. Id.
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nature of this problem, it is understandable that courts may defer to persons'
religious views. If exemptions from anti-discrimination laws are easily obtained,
the laws will no longer be effective. 2"
The context in which religious landlords are conducting their exercise of
religion is a fourth reason that preventing marital status discrimination in
housing is a compelling interest. When a vendor offers goods or services to the
general public, instead of to a limited section of society, the state's interest in
ensuring that those goods or services are distributed in a manner which does not
violate its laws becomes greater. 8' When goods are offered to the general
public, there is an expectation that the vender intends to sell to all members of
the public, not just a select few. Entering the public marketplace also subjects
the vendor to the regulations that a government places upon such sales."
In
contrast, if a religious landlord only offers her apartments to those within her
religious community, society's expectation of discrimination-free access to
housing is not as great as when the same landlord offers her apartments to the
general public.283 It is the choice of religious landlords to expose their beliefs
2
to the heavily-regulated commercial activity of the housing rental market. 84
Thus, the government's interest in providing unmarried cohabitants with
equal access to housing is compelling for several reasons. Housing is something
that all people need. Secondly, the landlord voluntarily chose to enter a
commercial activity which is regulated by anti-discrimination laws.
Furthermore, the economic situation of some tenants may not permit living
separately. Nor is there a reason to question the motivation of an unmarried
person's interest in housing merely because that person is cohabiting with
another person of the opposite sex, while there may be legitimate reasons to
scrutinize an unmarried person's interest in seeking other benefits. 21 Finally,
there is the "slippery slope" of allowing religious defenses to anti-discrimination
laws. Is it truly possible to enunciate a principled theory to justify these

280. Laskowska, supra note 243, at 251.
281. Eckel, supra note 216, at 845. See Smith v. Fair Employment & Hous. Comm'n, 913
P.2d 909, 928 (Cal. 1996) ("To say that [the prospective tenants] may rent elsewhere is also to deny
them the right to be treated equally by commercial enterprises; this dignity interest is impaired by
even one landlord's refusal to rent, whether or not the prospective tenants eventually find housing
elsewhere.").
282. United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 261 (1982) (holding that religious persons who
voluntarily enter into commercial activity are not able to avoid statutes, because of their own
religious beliefs, which regulate others in that activity).
283. Eckel, supra note 216, at 845.
284. Laskowska, supra note 243, at 250. See Cordish, supra note 118, at 2136-37 (explaining
Professor Bruce Bagni's three concentric circle approach to government regulation of religious
organization activities).
285. See supra notes 243-50 and accompanying text.
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defenses trumping some anti-discrimination laws but not others? If it is not,
then we should not try to line-draw arbitrarily. Yet, determining that the
government's interest in protecting unmarried cohabitants' access to housing is
compelling is only the first part of RFRA's strict scrutiny test.
2. Least Restrictive Means
Once a compelling interest has been shown, RFRA's final requirement is
that the governmental action use the "least restrictive means" to serve that
interest.216 Laws are considered to use the least restrictive means when they
are directed only to the actions which the legislatures have determined impede
the state's goal. 2 87 In the situation of unmarried couples, the governmental
interest is to prevent unmarried cohabitants from being denied housing which is
the same quality and cost to which single and married people have access. 28
This goal is impeded by the actions of religious landlords who refuse to rent
housing to unmarried couples because they believe they would be facilitating sin.
Statutes which prohibit landlords from denying rental opportunities to potential
tenants because of their marital status apply specifically to the actions which the
legislature intended to address. 2 9 There are no less restrictive means which
would lessen or remove the burden on landlords while still achieving the
intended goal .21 Thus, because these statutes only prohibit the action which
threatens the state interest, they are the least restrictive means to achieve the
government interest.
Another way to understand how the Court views the "least restrictive
means" requirement is by discussing an alternative manner in which the least
restrictive means test is phrased in the free exercise arena. According to this
phrasing, a governmental action utilizes the "least restrictive means" if
accommodating the religious belief would "unduly interfere with [the] fulfillment

286. See supra note 98. Using the "least restrictive means" is also required under the preSmith free exercise jurisprudence. Thomas v. Review Bd., Ind. Employment Sec. Div. 450 U.S.
707, 718 (1981); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 407 (1963).
287. See American Life League, Inc. v. Reno, 47 F.3d 642, 656 (4th Cir. 1995) (analyzing
whether the Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act was the least restrictive means to effectuate
the government's compelling interest).
288. See Attorney Gen. v. Desilets, 636 N.E.2d 233, 240 (Mass. 1994) (noting that impeding
the availability of rental housing for persons who wish to cohabit would support a compelling
interest); Swanner v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n, 874 P.2d 274, 282-83 (Alaska 1994) (noting
that the state has a compelling interest in preventing every instance of discrimination based on
irrelevant characteristics).
289. Swanner, 874 P.2d at 280 n.9 (stating that "[T]he most effective tool the state has for
combatting discrimination is to prohibit discrimination; these laws do exactly that. Consequently,
the means are narrowly tailored and there is no less restrictive alternative.").
290. Cooper v. French, 460 N.W.2d 2, 19-20 (Minn. 1990) (Popovich, C.J., dissenting);
Swanner, 874 P.2d at 280 n.9.
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of the governmental interest " "' or render the government's goal
unworkable. 2" Since the governmental interest in the instance of marital
status discrimination is to prevent landlords from discriminating against
unmarried cohabitants in rental housing, accommodating the landlords' religious
beliefs which motivate the landlord to refuse to rent would indeed unduly
interfere with the government's goal. 2" In fact, such accommodation would
entirely defeat the intent of the statute. 2' Thus, under either interpretation of
the least restrictive means prong of the compelling interest test, laws preventing
unmarried tenants from being denied housing due to landlords' religious
preferences are the least restrictive means of achieving the governmental
interest. Coupled with the conclusion that marital status discrimination laws also
serve a compelling interest, these laws would be able to survive the strict
2
scrutiny analysis under RFRA. 1
In summary, unmarried couples' first means of combating RFRA's effect
upon landlords' free exercise defenses is to demonstrate that the laws which
protect them from discriminatory landlords do not substantially burden the
landlords' exercise of religion. 2'
However, the deference which Supreme
Court jurisprudence has given to religious claims 29 may prove to be a barrier
to the success of this first method. If the first method should fail, then the
second method would require the unmarried couples to demonstrate that there
is a compelling state interest in protecting their right to equal access of housing.
This two-pronged approach shows that whether RFRA is not implicated or
whether RFRA is satisfied, RFRA is ultimately not a barrier to legislatures'
intent to protect unmarried couples' equal access to housing. Despite this fact,
Congress must still address the effect of RFRA on landlords' free exercise
defenses. This is necessary because lower courts are permitting RFRA to
function as a defense to unmarried couples' marital status discrimination claims.
Lower courts are finding that marital status discrimination prohibition provisions
are substantial burdens upon landlords' free exercise of religion and that the
government has no compelling interest in assuring unmarried couples' access to
housing.298 To fully protect unmarried couples' access to equal housing,

291. United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 259 (1982).
292. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 408-09 (1963).
293. Cooper, 460 N.W.2d at 20 (Popovich, C.J., dissenting).
294. Id.
295. Swanner v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n, 874 P.2d 274,284 (Alaska 1994) (reaching
this conclusion under an analysis of Alaska free exercise principles); Cooper,460 N.W.2d at 19-20
(Popovich, C.J., dissenting) (reaching this conclusion under an analysis of Minnesota free exercise
jurisprudence).
296. See supra notes 159-228 and accompanying text.
297. See supra notes 98, 103-04, 161 (explaining that the Supreme Court's jurisprudence prior
to Employment Division v. Smith is what guides courts in their interpretation of RFRA).
298. See supra note 130.
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Congress should prohibit marital status discrimination and simultaneously correct
the lower courts' misinterpretation of RFRA by making it inapplicable to the
protections against discrimination in housing.
V.

AMENDING THE FAIR HOUSING ACT SOLVES ONE PROBLEM
BUT CREATES ANOTHER

After examining the differing degrees of protection which the states grant
to unmarried couples in housing,2 it is clear that to uniformly protect
unmarried cohabitants' access to housing, national legislation is necessary. An
existing statute, the federal Fair Housing Act (FHA), already prohibits certain
The Act's goal is "to provide, within
forms of discrimination in housing.'
constitutional limitations, for fair housing throughout the United States. " 3°'
Thus, an amendment to this act is the most logical manner in which to protect
unmarried couples' rights to equal access to housing.'
Currently, the FHA

299. See supra notes 130-37 and accompanying text.
300. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619, 3631 (1994). The Fair Housing Act was a part of the Civil
Rights Act of 1968, passed in memory of Martin Luther King, Jr. UNITED STATES COMMISSION
ON CIVIL RIGHTS, THE FAIR HOUSING AMENDMENTS ACT OF 1988: THE ENFORCEMENT REPORT
8 (1994) [hereinafter ENFORCEMENT REPORT]. In fact, the assassination of King in early 1968
hastened the passage of the Act. Jean Eberhart Dubofsky, FairHousing: A Legislative History and
a Perspective, 8 WASHBURN L.J. 149, 160 (1969). It originally prohibited discrimination based on
race, color, religion and national origin in most housing transactions. ENFORCEMENT REPORT,
supra, at 8. The FHA gave the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development the authority
to investigate and conciliate complaints of housing discrimination, but the Act provided no power
to remedy any acts of discrimination against an individual. Id. In 1988, many housing experts
participated in a conference to discuss the shortcomings of the FHA of 1968. Guido Calabresi,
Preface to THE FAIR HOUSING ACT AFTER TWENTY YEARS 7 (Robert G. Schwemm ed., 1989).
Several reasons for its failure were put forth; all agreed that the Act did not meet expectations. Id.
For further discussion of the shortcomings of the 1968 FHA, see id. In 1988, the Fair Housing
Amendments Act was passed, adding prohibitions against discrimination based on familial status or
against handicapped persons. Pub. L, No. 100-430, 102 Stat. 1619 (1988) (codified as amended
at 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619, 3631 (1994)). The 1988 Amendments also strengthen HUD's
enforcement powers, providing an administrative mechanism for enforcement, which could result
in damages or civil penalties and a trial in an administrative court. ENFORCEMENT REPORT, supra,
at 11.
The FHA reaches private housing in addition to public housing and military housing. Peter
Brandon Bayer, Rationality-and the Irrational Underinclusiveness of the Civil Rights Laws, 45
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1, 67 (1988). The constitutional justification for this broad reach of power
is the Thirteenth Amendment. Id.
301. 42 U.S.C. § 3601 (1994).
302. One commentator has even proposed such an amendment to the FHA. See Smith, supra
note 21, at 1092-97 & n. 159 (proposing that to fully protect unmarried couples' right to access the
basic human need of housing, Congress should amend the FHA to include a prohibition against
marital status discrimination and define "marital status" to protect unmarried couples).
Unfortunately, amending the FHA is only the first step. An amendment which merely prohibited
discrimination on the basis of marital status would not adequately protect tenants from landlords'
claims that their free exercise rights are burdened by renting to unmarried couples. See infra notes
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only prohibits landlords from refusing to sell or rent a dwelling' based on the
tenants' race, color, religion, sex, familial status, handicap or national
origin.'
The Act does not prohibit marital status discrimination.'
The
FHA also prevents landlords from discriminating in the terms, conditions, or
privileges of the sale or rental of a dwelling,' and also from printing any

325-28 and accompanying text.
303. "Dwelling," as defined by the Act includes any "building, structure, or portion thereof
which is occupied as, a residence by one or more families . . . ." 42 U.S.C. § 3602(b) (1994).
The court in United States v. Real Estate Development Corp., 347 F.Supp. 776 (D. Miss. 1972),
held that an apartment building was considered a "dwelling" for the purposes of the FHA. Id.
304. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a), (f)(1)(A) (1994). The Act provides in relevant part:
[lit shall be unlawful(a) To refuse to sell or rent after the making of a bona fide offer, or to refuse to
negotiate for the sale or rental of, or otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling
to any person because of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin
(f)(1) To discriminate in the sale or rental, or to otherwise make unavailable or deny,
a dwelling to any buyer or renter because of a handicap of(A) that buyer or renter ....
305. No existing prohibited bases of discrimination in the FHA could be interpreted to protect
unmarried couples and thus obviate the proposed amendment. Not even the definition of "familial
status" could be reasonably expanded to include marital status. "Familial status" is defined by the
FHA to only include persons domiciled with a parent or legal custodian, the designee of such parent
or custodian, persons who are pregnant or who are in the process of securing legal custody of a
person under 18 years of age. 42 U.S.C. § 3602(k) (1994). "Familial status" was a category added
by the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-430, § 6, 102 Stat. 1622 (1988),
specifically in response to a survey which revealed discrimination in housing rentals against families
with children. James C. Frooman, Statutory Analysis of the FamilialStatus Provision of the Fair
Housing Amendments Act of 1988-0r, "Why Do I Have to Live With Those Curtain-ClimbingRug
Rats?, " 17 N. KY. L. REv. 215, 217-19 (1989). This 1980 Housing and Urban Development
survey found that 25% of rental units did not allow children, 50% of all rental units had policies
which restricted the ability of families to live in them, and nearly 20% of families were living in
homes which were below their means due to restrictive policies. H.R. REP. No. 100-711, at 19
(1988), reprintedin 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2173, 2180. Finally, "familial status" was not intended
to include marital status: the Committee on the Judiciary, which was assigned to amend the FHA
specifically stated that it "did not intend this definition [of familial status] to include marital status."
Id.
Currently, the only way to circumvent the fact that the existing provisions of the FHA do not
reach marital status discrimination is by disparate impact: if the marital status discrimination creates
a disproportional racial, ethnic, religious, or gender-based impact. James A. Kushner, The Fair
Housing Amendments Act of 1988: The Second Generation of Fair Housing, 42 VAND. L. REV.
1049, 1106 (1989).
306. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(b), (f)(2)(A) (1994). The Act provides in relevant part:
[I]t shall be unlawful(b) To discriminate against any person in the terms, conditions, or privileges of sale or
rental of a dwelling, or in the provision of services or facilities in connection therewith,
because of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin.

(f) .

[or] because of a handicap of(A) that person . ...

. .
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advertisement which indicates a preference, limitation or discrimination based
on any of the previously-mentioned characteristics.'
Two considerations
come into play when looking to the Fair Housing Act to address the problems
facing unmarried cohabitants. The first consideration is the provisions of the
FHA which prevent its application to certain instances of discrimination. The
second issue to consider is the interaction of such an amendment to the FHA
with the Religious Freedom Restoration Act.
An important limitation of the FHA in preventing any sort of housing
discrimination is that the FHA does not prohibit every instance of discrimination
against the categories of persons which it protects. The Act provides for a
limited number of exemptions which allow certain landlords to discriminate
against tenants on the basis of the tenants' race, color, religion, sex, familial
status, handicap or national origin."' These exemptions are important to note
when considering the efficacy of any provision of the FHA in preventing a
particular type of discrimination, including marital status discrimination.'
The first of these exemptions allows religious organizations to limit the
rental or occupancy of dwellings which the organization owns or operates, for

Id.
307. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(c) (1994). The Act provides in relevant part:
[I]t shall be unlawful(c) To make, print, or publish, or cause to be made, printed, or published any notice,
statement, or advertisement, with respect to the sale or rental of a dwelling that indicates
any preference, limitation, or discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex,
handicap, familial status, or national origin, or an intention to make any such
preference, limitation, or discrimination.
Id.
Additionally, the FHA prohibits a landlord "ltlo represent to any person because of race,
color, religion, sex, handicap, familial status, or national origin that any dwelling is not available
for inspection, sale, or rental when such dwelling is in fact so available." Id. § 3604(d).
Finally, the FHA prohibits a landlord to "[flor profit, to induce or attempt to induce any
person to sell or rent any dwelling by representations regarding the entry or prospective entry into
the neighborhood of a person or persons of a particular race, color, religion, sex, handicap, familial
status, or national origin." Id. § 3604(e).
308. See infra notes 310-24 and accompanying text.
Discrimination based on these
characteristics is otherwise forbidden under the Fair Housing Act. See supra notes 304, 306-07.
309. It should be noted that the legislative intent behind these exemptions is unclear. United
States v. Mitchell, 327 F. Supp. 476, 480-81 (N.D. Ga. 1971). This is due to the fact that the
"open housing" portion of the Civil Rights Act of 1968 was passed by the legislature as an
amendment by the Senate to the House's anti-riot bill which was more in the political forefront at
that time. Id. The Congressional Record indicates that there was little discussion on the "open
housing" amendments, so it is difficult to know exactly what the Senate intended by including those
amendments and their exceptions. Id.
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other than commercial purposes, to members of the same religion."' This
exemption is not likely to create a loophole large enough for the purpose of the
proposed amendments to be circumvented.
No cases of marital status
discrimination in housing have yet involved a landlord who was a religious

organization."'
Another exemption under the FHA is what is known as the "Mrs. Murphy's
Boarding House" exemption.312 This exemption allows landlords of a dwelling
which has no more than four units to discriminate in their selection of tenants
if the landlord lives in one of the units.3" 3 This provision was included in the
Fair Housing Act of 1968' as a compromise to protect owners of boarding
houses and to win a majority of votes to ensure the Act's passage.315 It is
difficult to estimate how many religious landlords to which the exemption

310. 42 U.S.C. § 3607(a) (1994). This statute provides in relevant part:
Nothing in this subchapter shall prohibit a religious organization, association, or society
...from limiting the sale, rental or occupancy of dwellings which it owns or operates
for other than a commercial purpose to persons of the same religion . . . unless
membership in such religion is restricted on account of race, color, or national origin.
Id.
Thus, if membership in the religious organization is not restricted according to race, color,
or national origin, the organization is permitted to discriminate according to religion in the dwellings
it sells or rents. Id.
311. Swanner v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n, 874 P.2d 274, 276 (Alaska 1994) (landlord
was real estate agent); Donahue v. Fair Employment & Hous. Comm'n, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 32, 33
(Cal. Ct. App. 1991) (landlord was private individual); Smith v. Fair Employment & Hous.
Comm'n, 913 P.2d 909, 911-12 (Cal. 1996) (same); Cooper v. French, 460 N.W.2d 2, 3 (Minn.
1990) (same); Attorney Gen. v. Desilets, 636 N.E.2d 233, 234 (Mass. 1994) (same).
312. 42 U.S.C. § 3603(b)(2) (1994). This exemption seems to have been dubbed the "Mrs.
Murphy's Boarding House" exemption during debate on the 1968 Fair Housing Act. Dubofsky,
supra note 300, at 156, 161.
313. 42 U.S.C. § 3603(b)(2) (1994). The Act in relevant part provides:
(b) Exemptions
Nothing in section 3604 of this titie .
shall apply to(2) rooms or units in dwellings containing living quarters occupied or intended to be
occupied by no more than four families living independently of each other, if the owner
actually maintains and occupies one of such living quarters as his [or her] residence.
Id.
314. Id. §§ 3601-3631.
315. Dubofsky, supra note 300, at 156. One author has expressed his opinion concerning this
.compromise": this exemption allows "'Mrs. Murphy' . . . to express herself by indulging her
racist tastes, if any, and societal support for her freedom to discriminate trumps the conflicting
personal and societal interests in prohibiting discrimination." Sam Stonefield, Non-Determinative
Discrimination, Mixed Motives, and the Inner Boundary of DiscriminationLaw, 35 BUFF. L. REV.
85, 101 (1986).
Approximately half of the state fair housing laws include such a provision. Cordish, supra
note 118, at 2141 n.144. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 18.80.240 (1994); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46a64c(b)(1) (West 1995); OR. REV. STAT. § 659.033 (1991). Id. at 2141 n.6.
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316. The Bureau of the Census has collected statistics on the number of units which are owneroccupied and renter-occupied, and also the number of units which consist of more than four units.
This data was not assembled with the "Mrs. Murphy's Boarding House" exception in mind, so the
two categories of data are not merged to provide accurate information of how many total units of
housing are between one and four in which the landlord also resides. Still, the Census data provides
some useful information:
County, State

Lake,
Ind.*

Marion,
Ind.*

Porter,
Ind.*

Cook,
Ill.**

DuPage,
Ill.**

Ratio Own-Occ'd
to Renter-Occ'd

2.1:1

1.3:1

3.0:1

1.2:1

2.9:1

County, State

Will,

Champaign,

St. Clair,

Johnson,

Polk,

Ratio Own-Occ'd
to Renter-Occ'd

3.4:1

1.2:1

1.8:1

1.1:1

1.9:1

County, State

Lake,
Ind.t

Marion,
Ind.t

Porter,
Ind.t

Cook, I1l.
t?

DuPage,
II1. tt

% of Tot. Dwell.
that are 5 + Units

13.5%

26.0%

8.8%

32.8%

25.1%

County, State

Will, Ill.
tt

Champaign,
Il. tt

St. Clair,
Ill, tt

Johnson,
la.ttt

Polk, Ia.
ttt

% of Tot. Dwell.
that are 5 + Units

10.3%

26.0%

10.5%

28.5%

21.6%

*BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMMERCE, 1990 CENSUS OF POPULATION &
HOUSING, SUMMARY SOCIAL, ECONOMIC AND HOUSING CHARACTERISTICS, INDIANA, at tbl. 15
(1992).
** Id., ILLINOIS, at tbl. 15.
*** Id., IOWA, at tbl. 15.
t BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMMERCE, 1990 CENSUS OF POPULATION AND

HOUSING, SUMMARY POPULATION AND HOUSING CHARACTERISTICS, INDIANA, at tl. 7 (1991).
tt Id., ILLINOIS, at tbl. 7.
ttt Id., IOWA, at tbl. 7.
Summarizing these counties' data, between approximately 9% and 33% of dwellings are in
buildings of 5 or more units, and between approximately 25% and 50% of dwellings are renteroccupied, depending on the locale. For the best application of this data to the problem of the "Mrs.
Murphy's Boarding House" exemption, other data must be theoretically included. Such data may
include estimates of how many unmarried partner households there are in each county, if such data
exists, and how many landlords in a county believe that renting to unmarried couples is against their
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exemption are very difficult to find because neither housing agencies nor the
31 7
Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) keep such statistics.
When complaints of discrimination which fall into one of these exemptions are
received, they are not pursued for lack of jurisdiction.3" 8 These agencies' lack
of resources prevents them from keeping data of how many complaints could not
be pursued due to particular exemptions.31 9 From what the cases indicate
about what types of units were involved in the marital status discrimination
cases, it seems that none of those landlords could have been permitted to
discriminate against any person due to this exemption.32 While the numbers
of unmarried couples who may be discriminated against amount to less than a
majority of the population, the number of individuals who are affected is not
directly proportional to the seriousness of the deprivation. Depriving even a
small number of people of the access to the same quality and cost of housing to
which others have access is still detrimental to those people who are denied housing. 32

religion, which is even more difficult to tabulate.
317. Telephone Interview with Pat Sullivan, Director of Fair Housing Enforcement of HUD's
Midwestern Region (Feb. 23, 1996).
318. Id. In other words, if the landlord lives in the building and the building has no more than
four units, then the situation falls within this exemption and no cause of action lies under the FHA.
319. Id. Sullivan's personal estimate of the number of general housing discrimination
complaints (i.e. including discrimination by race, handicap, familial status, etc.) which are not
pursued for lack of jurisdiction was approximately 25 of 3000 complaints received in one year. Id.
320. This exemption would not have exempted the landlords in Donahue v. FairEmployment
& Housing Commission, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 32, 33 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991) (landlord owned a five-unit
building); Jasniowski v. Rushing, 94 CH 5546, 1 (Cook County Cir. Ct. Dec. 22, 1994) (landlord
leased a building partly for business and partly as a rental apartment, i.e. one unit); Attorney Gen.
v. Desilets, 636 N.E.2d 233, 234-35 (Mass. 1994) (landlord owned a four-unit building; facts do
not indicate that landlord lived there); Cooper v. French, 460 N.W.2d 2, 3 (Minn. 1990) (landlord
rented a single family home, i.e. one unit); Smith v. Fair Employment & Hous. Comm'n, 913 P.2d
909, 912 (Cal. 1996) (landlord owned and rented two duplexes, i.e. two units; she did not live
there). The decision in Swanner v. Anchorage Equal Rights Commission, 874 P.2d 274 (Alaska
1994), does not indicate the type of properties which the landlord refused to rent.
321. The Alaska Supreme Court in Swanner held that not only did Alaska have a 'derivative
interest' in providing access to housing for everyone, but it also had a 'transactional interest' in
prohibiting each and every individual act of discrimination based on irrelevant characteristics.
Swanner, 874 P.2d at 282.
The Mrs. Murphy's Boarding House exemption is also relevant to the burden which is imposed
upon landlords by being required to rent to unmarried cohabitants. The free exercise of religion of
landlords who object to the behavior of unmarried cohabitants and who live in close proximity to
their tenants would arguably be more significantly burdened than similarly religious landlords who
do not live in the same building as their tenants. Their burden would be more significant because
of the constant reminder of the presence of the unmarried couples and the conduct in which the
landlords presume the tenants are engaging. This is not a trivial argument constitutionally speaking,
for it potentially involves interests of freedom of intimate association, as well as the free exercise
of religion. However, whether or not the rationale behind this exemption was to specifically take
into account these interests, the existence of this exemption can arguably be interpreted to
accommodate these interests. While neither the situations which fall within the Mrs. Murphy's
Boarding House exemption-nor the situations which do not-impose a substantial burden upon the
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A third exemption applies to single family homes. If the owner-occupant
of a single family home sells or rents that home without the use of a broker, and
does not own more than three single-family houses at once, then the owner may
discriminate against the person to whom the owner sells or rents the house. 3'
Of the cases of marital status discrimination in housing which have thus been
heard, only one landlord would have seemed to be exempt from the provisions
of the FHA under this category.323 Since there are few statistics which could
inform a discussion on this exemption, it is not appropriate to judge whether or
not this exemption would hinder unmarried couples' access to housing. 324
Though these exemptions may affect the actual number of landlords to
whom the FHA would apply, there is a problem with merely amending the FHA
to prohibit marital status discrimination. Just as amendments to state fair
housing laws have not been able to fully protect unmarried couples' access to
housing because landlords have been successful in arguing that such laws impose
a burden upon their free exercise of religion, 3' a similar amendment to the
FHA would likely suffer similar consequences. If the FHA is just amended to
prohibit marital status discrimination, unmarried couples at the federal level
would be placed in the same situation they previously faced at the state level:
able to bring a claim under the fair housing laws, but ultimately defeated by

landlord, the exemption is a form of compromise. Since the FHA already incorporates an exemption
for the situation which would be the most burdensome upon the landlord, the remaining situations
to which the proposed amendment will apply are even less of a burden upon the landlord.
See Cordish, supra note 118, at 2133 (stating that the Mrs. Murphy exception "statutorily
raise[s] the rights of privacy and free association of an on-site owner above the government's interest
in prohibiting discrimination").
One author has proposed solving the clash between anti-discriminatory aims and free exercise
rights by adopting a "Mrs. Murphy" approach. Id. at 2138. The benefit of this solution is that it
is not based on a hierarchy of rights but upon the context in which the discrimination occurs. Id.
at 2139.
322. 42 U.S.C. § 3603(b)(1) (1994). The Act provides in relevant part:
(b) Exemptions
Nothing in section 3604 of this title ... shall apply to(1) any single-family house sold or rented by an owner: Provided, That such private
individual owner does not own more than three such single-family houses at any one
time... only if such house is sold or rented (A) without the use in any manner of the
sales or rental facilities . . . of any real estate broker . . . and (B) without the
publication ... of any advertisement or written notice in violation of section 3604(c)
of this title ....
323. Cooper v. French, 460 N.W.2d 2, 3 (Minn. 1990) (landlord denied rental of a single
family home to the unmarried couple). The decision in Swanner does not indicate the type of
properties which the landlord refused to rent. Swanner, 874 P.2d at 274.
324. There is some old data finding that in 1968, only 11.2% of all housing units fit the
requirements of this exemption. Dubofsky, supra note 300, at 157. If this percentage has not
increased significantly, then tenants will be favored in that not many landlords' situations will fall
under this exemption.
325. See supra note 130 and accompanying text.
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Because RFRA utilizes the same test
landlords' free exercise defenses.326
37
under which most states currently analyze their free exercise clauses, 2
landlords would prevail under RFRA just as they have prevailed in state courts
in most of the jurisdictions which have heard such cases.328
Since RFRA will likely create a defense for landlords who claim that
complying with the amended FHA burdens their free exercise of religion, an
additional amendment is necessary. Preventing RFRA from circumventing
protection for unmarried couples in housing is the final step in assuring
unmarried couples' equal access to housing. This second amendment will
prevent religious defenses from being used as exceptions to discrimination
prohibited by the Fair Housing Act. Fully protecting unmarried cohabitants'
equal access to housing requires the implementation of both of these
amendments.
VI.

PROPOSED AMENDMENTS PROHIBITING MARITAL STATUS
DISCRIMINATION AND ELIMINATING RFRA AS A DEFENSE
TO MARITAL STATUS DISCRIMINATION

This Note proposes to amend the Fair Housing Act329 to prohibit
discrimination based on marital status. This Note further proposes to amend
RFRA 3 ° to exempt the application of RFRA to marital status discrimination
in housing. 3 ' Together, both amendments prevent the renewed success of
landlords' religious defenses to marital status discrimination claims which courts
are effectuating under RFRA. 332 These amendments are vital to accomplish

326. See supra note 130 for a listing of the cases in which this occurred. At the state level,
the basis for landlords' defenses was the states' free exercise clauses; at the federal level, the basis
for landlords' defenses would be RFRA.
327. In states which utilize an analysis which is less stringent than the strict scrutiny/compelling
interest test which RFRA requires, RFRA will provide a stronger defense than the state's free
exercise clause. In those cases, landlords would be likely to avail themselves of RFRA and the
amendment which this note proposes would apply.
328. See supra note 130.
329. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619, 3631 (1994).
330. Id. § 2000bb to bb-4.
331. Ideally, the amendment to RFRA would prohibit the use of RFRA as a defense to any type
of discrimination proscribed by the FHA as a whole. The scope of this note, however, only permits
discussion of the RFRA amendment in the context of marital status discrimination.
332. When marital status is a prohibited basis of discrimination in the FHA, any unmarried
couple-regardless of whether or not there is an analogous provision in their state's fair housing
laws-who encounters discrimination can bring a federal cause of action against a violating landlord.
Clearly, an unmarried couple who lives in a state which does not already have its own provision
prohibiting marital status discrimination will be the most benefitted by the FHA's prohibition of such
discrimination.
Admittedly, the amendment proposed by this note will be of no assistance to a tenant whose
state has such a provision and who bases her action only upon her state's marital status
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the protection of all tenants' rights to housing which are currently only available
to citizens who are not unmarried couples or those unmarried couples who are
lucky enough to find landlords who do not object to the tenants' marital status.
A. ProposedAmendment to FHA ProhibitingMarital Status Discrimination
The amendment to the FHA would not be very complex. The words
"marital status" would be added to the list of prohibited forms of discrimination
in several sections of the FHA.333 The amendment must also explicitly define
"marital status" to apply to unmarried couples. 3
As some state courts'
legislative interpretation has shown,335 it does not follow that "marital status"
automatically applies to unmarried cohabitants.336 Without specific inclusion
in the definition of "marital status," unmarried couples are likely to not be
afforded the full protection intended by this amendment.337

discrimination provision. A gap in the goal of ensuring equal access to tenants thus seems evident
because the outcome of her claim will be determined by how that state's courts define marital status
and whether those courts consider providing equal access to housing for unmarried couples to be a
compelling interest. See supra note 130 for a discussion of how some state courts have already
handled these issues. However, with the existence of both amendments which this note proposes,
it seems probable that tenants will forego basing their claim on their state's statute and proceed under
the FHA instead. The power of this amendment will short-circuit a landlord's potential defense of
a free exercise exemption and will motivate tenants who are discriminated against to proceed under
the FHA, closing the apparent gap.
Furthermore, if a tenant brings a claim under the FHA, a landlord cannot raise a free exercise
defense to such a claim under the state constitution's Free Exercise Clause. See Northwest Central
Pipeline Corp. v. State Corp. Comm'n, 489 U.S. 493, 509 (1989). A federal right, created by a
statute or the federal Constitution, cannot be trumped by a state constitutional provision. Id.
333. To effect this change, Congress would need to amend 42 U.S.C. §§ 3604(a)-(e), 3605(a),
3605(c), 3606, 3613(a)-(c) (1994). Smith, supra note21, at 1095 n.158. See supra notes 304, 30607.
334. See Smith, supra note 21, at 1097 n.159 (proposing that marital status be defined as "the
state of being single, married, separated, divorced, or widowed, and includes the marriage or lack
of a marriage between a man and woman cohabiting or intending to cohabit").
335. See supra note 130.
336. See supra note 130 for a discussion about the definition of "marital status" and its
implications. While in some cases, the landlords argued that the state's marital status discrimination
prohibition did not apply to unmarried cohabitants because what the landlord was objecting to was
the couple's "conduct" and not their "status," this is a specious distinction. The majority in
Attorney General v. Desilets provides an apt explanation as to why this distinction is inappropriate.
Desilets, 636 N.E.2d 233, 235 (Mass. 1994). The Desilets court explained that if married couple
"A-who presumably engages in sexual relations-sought to rent an apartment from a religious
landlord, the landlord would have no objection. Id.
If unmarried couple "B"--who also
presumably engages in sexual relations-sought to rent the same apartment, the landlord would
object. Id. The only difference between these two couples situations is their marital status. Id.
337. Smith, supra note 21, at 1093-96. There is also some discussion that "marital status" may
be interpreted to apply to same-sex couples. See Neuman, supra note 10, at 996-99. For the same
reasons that landlords should be prohibited from discriminating against unmarried couples, it may
be argued that "marital status" should apply to same-sex couples. However, such implications are
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B. ProposedAmendment to RFRA Making the Act Inapplicable as a Defense
to the FHA
1. Proposed Amendment
Section 2000bb-1 of RFRA should be amended to include:
This chapter shall not be construed to serve as a defense to the
prohibition of marital status discrimination, as defined in the Fair
33
Housing Act. 1
2. Analysis of Proposed Amendment
Since RFRA is a statutory creation and it exceeds the protection which is
provided under the Free Exercise Clause, Congress can choose to limit RFRA's
application to other situations which are regulated by prior statutes, such as the
FHA. 339 Thus, if RFRA is held to be constitutional, an amendment to the Act
would merely be an exercise of Congress' legislative function.'
Further, the
proposed amendment does not contravene Congress' intent in RFRA14 1 because
RFRA was intended to protect the free exercise of religion from substantial
burdens by the government which are not justified by a compelling interest.23
As this Note has shown, the burden on religious landlords is not substantial and
3
it is justified by a compelling interest.1
While the need for the amendment to RFRA may be questioned because this
Note's argument is that RFRA is either not triggered or is satisfied, the
amendment is indispensable for two reasons. First, exempting RFRA from
providing a defense to marital status discrimination will be a clear indication of
Congress' intent. Such an amendment will indicate that Congress did not intend

beyond the scope of this note.
338. See supra notes 300-07.
339. See CHOPER, supra note 52, at 58.
340. Id. The restriction on Congress with regard to quasi-constitutional legislation is that
Congress cannot eliminate any protection of constitutional provisions which the Supreme Court has
interpreted to exist. See also Eisgruber & Sager, supra note 91, at 462. Aside from that limitation,
Congress can adjust "remedial legislation" which is more protective of tights than the Constitution.
Id. If RFRA is interpreted as "remedial legislation," and not as an attempt by Congress to command
the Supreme Court to yield to Congress' interpretation of the Constitution's "liberty-bearing
provisions," RFRA may be constitutional. Id.
341. See supra notes 88-106 and accompanying text.
342. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-l(a), (b) (1994).
343. See supra notes 159-298 and accompanying text.
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By passing the
for rights under RFRA to trump rights under the FHA.'
amendment to the FHA prohibiting marital status discrimination, Congress will
clearly demonstrate its intent to protect unmarried couples and not to allow
another statute to circumvent that intent. This amendment is needed to
conclusively indicate to courts that RFRA was not meant to infringe upon the
housing rights of unmarried couples. Once Congress' intent is clear, it will be
the courts' duty to effectuate that intent. 34s Additionally, it is important that
the legislature enact this amendment because it is Congress which has the
authority and responsibility to effectuate social policy.'
The second reason this amendment is necessary is to provide uniform
guidance to lower courts. State courts' contradictory application of RFRA to
landlords' free exercise defenses clarifies why this amendment is important.'

344. One example of the need for such an indication is that RFRA was designed to apply to all
state or federal law, even if it was adopted before RFRA was passed. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb3(a)(1994) ('in general-This chapter applies to all Federal and State law, and the implementation
of that law, whether statutory or otherwise, and whether adopted before or after November 16,
1993."). Thus, any exceptions to the broad protection of RFRA need to be made explicitly. 42
U.S.C. § 2000bb-3(b)(1994) ("Rule of construction-Federal statutory law adopted after November
16, 1993 is subject to this chapter unless such law explicitly excludes such application by reference
to this chapter.").
345. Sullivan v. Everhart, 494 U.S. 83, 106 (1990) (Stevens, J.,dissenting) ("Our duty is to
ask what Congress intended, and not to assay whether Congress might have stated that intent more
naturally, more artfully, or more pithily."); Holder v. Hall, 114 S.Ct. 2581, 2624-25 (1994)
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
The statute's broad remedial purposes, as well as the constraints on the courts' remedial
powers, need to be carefully considered ...to arrive at an appropriate resolution of the
competing congressional concerns. However difficult this task may prove to be, it is
one that courts must undertake because it is their mission to effectuate Congress'
multiple purposes as best they can.
Id.
346. Holder, 114 S. Ct. at 2624-25.
347. See supra note 130.
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The amendment will provide landlords with clear guidance about their
responsibilities as rental property owners and provide uniformity as courts
expound upon free exercise jurisprudence in the area of marital status
discrimination in housing. Finally and most importantly, this proposed
amendment will provide unmarried cohabiting tenants with the same right to the
access to housing which other citizens already have.
VII. CONCLUSION

Housing is a basic human need. Yet, unmarried couples are being denied
equal access to housing because certain landlords believe that their religion
forbids them from facilitating the sin which unmarried couples commit by
fornication. Like the tenants from the Donahue v. FairEmployment & Housing
Commission case profiled in the Introduction of this Note 8 unmarried
couples are beginning to bring claims of discrimination against such landlords.
Landlords, in response, are raising free exercise of religion defenses grounded
in RFRA to tenants' claims. In nearly all of the cases already decided, the
landlords have prevailed and have been allowed to discriminate against
unmarried couples.
Some states have provisions which prohibit landlords from discriminating
on the basis of marital status. However, these provisions are not consistent in
their application to unmarried couples. Additionally, the landlords' defenses of
free exercise of religion almost always circumvent the marital status
discrimination provisions.
Thus, a federal provision which prohibits
discrimination in housing against unmarried couples is necessary. Such a
provision would indicate to the courts Congress' intent to protect unmarried
couples in the area of housing. Enacting such a law, however, is only the first
step to solving unmarried couples' housing problem. Due to Congress' earlier
passage of RFRA-legislation which is intended to statutorily protect the free
exercise of religion from substantial governmental burdens-landlords have a
defense with which they can challenge tenants' claims. If RFRA is used as a
defense to tenants' claims, their claims are likely to fail. Thus, a second
amendment is needed if Congress' intention of providing equal access to housing
for unmarried couples is to effectuated.
This amendment would prevent
landlords from raising RFRA as a defense to discrimination actions brought
under the FHA. While this Note does not deny that renting to unmarried
couples is a burden on landlords, the burden is not a substantial one and,
therefore, the excesses of government which RFRA was intended to prevent are
not implicated.
Similarly, the government has a compelling interest in
preventing this form of discrimination. Therefore, with the interaction of both

348. See supra notes 1-9 and accompanying text.
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amendments which this Note proposes, Congress can ensure that unmarried
couples have access to housing of like quality and expense that other citizens
already enjoy.
Keirsten G. Anderson
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